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Three Essays in Political Economy and Public Finance
Abstract
Chapter 1 evaluates the effect of relaxing fiscal rules on policy outcomes applying a quasi-
experimental research design. We implement a “difference-in-discontinuities" design by
combining the before/after with the discontinuous policy variation generated by the imple-
mentation of the Domestic Stability Pact on Italian municipalities between 1999 and 2004.
Our estimates show that relaxing fiscal rules triggers a substantial deficit bias, captured by a
shift from a balanced budget to a deficit that amounts to 2 percent of the total budget. The
deficit comes primarily from reduced revenues as unconstrained municipalities have lower
real estate and income tax rates. The impact is larger if the mayor can run for reelection,
the number of political parties seated in the city council is higher, voters are older, the
performance of the mayor in providing public good is lower, and cities are characterized
by historical deficit, consistently with models on the political economy of fiscal adjustment.
Chapter 2 studies the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide
anti tax evasion policy in Italy, which used innovative monitoring technologies to target
buildings hidden from tax authorities. The difference-in-differences identification strategy
exploits both variation across towns in the ex ante program scope to increase enforcement
as well as administrative data on actual building registrations. After the policy, local in-
cumbents experience an increase in their reelection likelihood. These political returns are
higher in areas with higher speed of public good provision and with lower tax evasion
tolerance, implying complementarity among enforcement policies, government efficiency,
and the underlying tax culture. Chapter 3 examines reasons for cross-country variation
iii
in maternity leave provision. We show that the less tolerant a society is of gender-based
discrimination, the longer the maternity leave it will optimally mandate. We collected
new data on the number of gender-differentiated personal pronouns across languages to
capture societies’ attitudes toward gender-based discrimination. We first confirm, using
within-country language variation, that our linguistic measure is correlated with attitudes
toward gender-based discrimination. Then, using cross-country data on length of maternity
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Chapter 1




Can fiscal restraints imposed on local governments create incentives for reducing the
accumulation of debt? The need for fiscal adjustment in the aftermath of the Great Recession
has revived interest in fiscal rules aimed at disciplining the discretionary power of policy
makers. Despite extensive research, the impact of fiscal restraints on debt accumulation and
their effectiveness in reducing politically motivated deficit remain highly debated.2 As the
authors in the literature have acknowledged—see, for example, the discussion in Poterba
(1996) or Alesina and Perotti (1996)—the search for a definitive conclusion is hampered by
the potentially endogenous decision of whether to adopt fiscal rules or not.3
1Co-authored with Veronica Grembi and Tommaso Nannicini.
2As indicated by Drazen (2002) in a review article: “A key question (perhaps the key question) about fiscal
rules is whether they have the effect of slowing the growth of deficits.”
3Furthermore, there has been limited investigation on fiscal rules at the local government level, where forms
of “hidden” public debt can grow and raise fears about the overall financial sustainability of a country. For
1
In this paper, we study the effect of relaxing fiscal restraints at the local government
level. We first show quasi-experimentally that fiscal rules do matter for restraining the
accumulation of debt and the fiscal adjustment is concentrated on revenues. We then give
evidence suggesting that the adjustment is driven by cities with more political distortions.
We overcome previous data and identification limitations by using a novel identification
design.
Our setting is Italy, where the central government set a target on deficit reduction for all
municipal governments in 1999—the so called “Domestic Stability Pact,” DSP henceforth—
and relaxed it for municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants in 2001. This policy change allows
us to combine two sources of variation, before/after 2001 and just below/above 5,000
inhabitants, and implement what we call a “difference-in-discontinuities” (or “diff-in-disc”)
design. It is important to note that a (standard) cross-sectional Regression Discontinuity
(RD) design would not allow us to identify the effect of relaxing fiscal rules in this setting.
The fact that there is another policy, started in the 1960s and still in place, according to
which mayors of cities above 5,000 residents receive a higher salary, implies that analyzing
the discontinuity at 5,000 residents in any given year would not identify the effect of the
DSP.
The intuition for our identification strategy is simple. The diff-in-disc estimator takes
the difference between the cross-sectional discontinuity at 5,000 after 2001 (when both fiscal
rules and the mayor’s salary show a jump) and the cross-sectional discontinuity at 5,000
before 2001 (when only the mayor’s salary shows a jump). We derive precise identifying
assumptions under which this estimator can identify different types of average treatment
effects in the neighborhood of the population threshold. The assumptions are more local
than those required for a difference-in-differences strategy, because they need to hold just at
the threshold of interest and not in the whole sample. We can therefore improve upon the
previous literature in terms of internal validity by identifying the causal effect of relaxing
a review of the current state of the literature, see Glaeser (2012). On the one hand, fiscal rules imposed on
local governments might be particularly effective because a higher level of government can credibly enforce
punishment. On the other hand, local governments usually have limited autonomy in adjusting fiscal policy.
2
fiscal restraints on policy outcomes.4
The main rule established by the DSP imposed a gradual reduction of the “fiscal gap,”
defined as the municipal deficit net of transfers and debt service. The rationale for the
exemption of municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants in 2001 was to avoid burdening
very small towns with onerous requirements, as they may be disadvantaged by economies of
scale in managing the municipal government. The penalties put in place for not complying
with the DSP included a cut in the annual transfers from the central government, a ban
on new hires, and a cut on reimbursement and non-absenteeism bonuses. This means
that, in the regulatory environment we study, there is a central authority that can collect
standardized public accounts and enforce punishment for non-compliers.
A number of studies have argued that there are several reasons why fiscal rules might
be ineffective in restraining fiscal policy (see, for example, the review by Alesina and Perotti,
1996, and Wyplosz, 2012).5 Additionally, the approval of the DSP was accompanied by
widespread skepticism about its effectiveness, as Italy usually ranks last among OECD
countries in ratings of law enforcement and government effectiveness (e.g., see Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010). In light of these arguments, our results suggest that the lessons
we draw from Italian municipalities on the effectiveness of fiscal rules may extend to other
regulatory environments where the fiscal authority setting the rules faces critical ex-ante
commitment problems.
We divide our empirical analysis into three parts. First, we analyze the impacts of
relaxing fiscal restraints on the deficit, which is the main policy variable of interest, and
on the fiscal gap, which is the main target of the law. We find that relaxing fiscal rules
4See Section 1.4 for a formal discussion of identification, estimation, and diagnostics in diff-in-disc.
5First, the fact that subnational policy makers have limited discretion in changing fiscal policy is the central
reason for which fiscal rules on local governments might not work. Second, most fiscal rules, including those we
are analyzing, are not embedded in the constitution. This implies that fiscal responsibility laws can be frequently
changed and revised, and they might suffer from the same time inconsistency problem that characterizes fiscal
policy. Additionally, Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that lax enforcement is one of the reasons why fiscal rules
might not work. This concern, however, is more relevant at the national level, since at the local level the central
government can be a credible enforcement authority. Finally, rules usually target only some parts of the budget
and this offers opportunities for policy makers to sidestep the rules by complying with them without changing
the overall fiscal discipline—see Milesi-Ferretti (2003).
3
translates into a larger fiscal gap of about 40 to 60 percent over the course of the following
4 years. This large effect on the main target of the DSP has real consequences for policy
outcomes, as unconstrained municipalities increase their deficit by 20 Euros per capita (2
percent of the total budget). The fact that we find an effect not only for the target of the
DSP, but also for the main policy variable of interest not targeted by the law (that is, debt
accumulation) alleviates concerns arising from the possibility of creative accounting.
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we study the composition of the fiscal
adjustment, by analyzing municipal financial reports and administrative data on municipal
tax rates, which are set by the local policy makers. We find that unconstrained municipalities
have statistically similar expenditure levels with respect to constrained municipalities, but
have lower tax revenues. This difference can be partially explained by the additional finding
that municipalities for which fiscal rules are relaxed set lower tax rates. The main tax rates
decided by Italian cities are a real estate tax rate on home property (Imposta Comunale sugli
Immobili, ICI), which provides almost 50 percent of municipal tax revenues, and a surcharge
on the personal income tax (Imposta sul Reddito delle Persone Fisiche, IRPEF), which amounts
to about 10 percent of municipal tax revenues. Cities for which fiscal rules are relaxed have
both a lower real estate tax rate (by about 14 percent) and a lower income tax surcharge (by
about 30 percent) after the policy shift.
Finally, in the third part of the analysis, we exploit the fact that our setup—that is,
an exogenously imposed fiscal destabilization—can provide new evidence on when fiscal
restraints matter the most. On the one hand, the optimal tax smoothing theory would
suggest that countercyclical deficits can increase welfare by equalizing the distortionary cost
of taxation across booms and recessions.6 On the other hand, a persistent deficit bias might
be the suboptimal result of the interplay between rational politicians, voters, and interest
groups. Our empirical findings suggest that political factors play a first-order role in fiscal
adjustments.
We first compare municipalities where only two political parties are represented in
6See Barro (1974), Barro (1979), and Lucas and Stokey (1983).
4
the local legislative assembly (about half of the sample) versus municipalities with more
parties. Our results show that relaxing fiscal rules increases the deficit only if more than
two parties are seated in the assembly, which must approve the budget proposed by the
mayor. This finding is consistent with models that explain deficit as the result of political
fragmentation and of dynamic common pool (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000), and also with
the cross-country evidence that coalition governments are associated with higher deficits
(see Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999).
We then study if the relaxation of fiscal rules is affected by whether the mayor faces a
binding term limit or not. We find that the increase in deficit bias arises only for mayors who
can be reelected. This result is consistent with models linking deficit to reelection incentives
(see Aghion and Bolton, 1990) or to politicians’ pandering to voters (see Maskin and Tirole,
2004). We also show that cities that increase the municipal deficit after the relaxation of
fiscal rules have an older population. These results are consistent with the model of Song,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012), according to which young citizens have a disciplining role
for fiscal policy because they internalize the future costs of present fiscal instability.
Furthermore, we relate our findings to models that formalize the welfare costs and
benefits of fiscal restraints. First, we show that the increase in deficit bias arises only for
mayors that systematically underprovide the public good promised to the voters in the
provisional budget. This evidence can be interpreted as consistent with the model of Besley
(2007), to the extent to which politicians who consistently overpromise public goods are
those who care more about reelection rather than social welfare. Finally, we relate our
findings to the empirical prediction of Battaglini and Coate (2008). These authors predict
that the welfare costs of restraining fiscal policy are limited when deficit is a historically
persistent phenomenon, rather than a cyclical one. We show that our results are not driven
by cities with cyclical deficit, and—if anything—the opposite is true, even if data limitations
do not allow us to draw a definitive conclusion.
Our results survive a large number of robustness checks. Among those, we use the
introduction of the DSP for all municipalities in 1999 as a falsification test to show that
5
our results are not driven by cities just below and above 5,000 responding differently to
the same set of fiscal rules. This test suggests that better paid (and, hence, better selected)
mayors do not react differently to the relaxation of the DSP compared to mayors with a
lower salary, and it is reassuring for the external validity of our results. Additionally, we
repeat our falsification exercise interacting our treatment variable with the heterogeneity
dimensions discussed above, in order to show that the law did not bind differently across
those subsamples.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the relevant literature. Section
1.3 describes the Italian institutional framework. Section 1.4 lays out our identification and
estimation strategy. Section 1.5 describes the data. Section 1.6 discusses the empirical results
and validity tests. We conclude with Section 1.7.
1.2 Related literature
This paper relates to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature that has
analyzed the effectiveness of fiscal rules.7 Indeed, a number of empirical studies have tried
to evaluate whether fiscal rules are associated with sounder budget outcomes, reaching
mixed conclusions. The evidence primarily comes from cross-country comparisons in
specific regions, such as the European Union (see Hallerberg and Von Hagen, 1999; Debrun
et al., 2008) or Latin America (see Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes, and Stein, 1996), and from
local governments in a federal state, such as the U.S. (see Poterba, 1994; 1996).8 While some
studies find that fiscal rules do indeed result in lower budget imbalances (e.g., see Knight,
2000), others stress the reasons for which fiscal restraints might not be effective (e.g., see
7For surveys, see Poterba and Von Hagen (1999), Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003), and Wyplosz (2012).
For an extensive review on the types of rules and the main empirical evaluations of their impact, see IMF (2009).
Balassone, Franco, and Zotteri (2004) review the literature on subnational fiscal rules in the European Union.
As we focus on local governments, our results are particularly relevant for the literature that has emphasized
that the implementation of subnational fiscal rules faces serious commitment problems, in the form of future
overhaul, soft budget constraints, and lack of enforcement: see, among others, Eichengreen and von Hagen
(1996), Braun and Tommasi (2004), Sutherland et al. (2005), and Ter-Minassian (2007).
8Studies on the U.S. include Von Hagen (1991), Alt and Lowry (1994), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995),
Bohn and Inman (1996), Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), Auerbach (2006), and Fatas and Mihov (2006).
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Alesina and Perotti, 1999).9 We provide a quasi-experimental design where the effectiveness
of fiscal rules is evaluated by controlling for omitted factors that may affect previous results,
such as the fact that more disciplined constituencies introduce tighter rules, or that (current
and past) legal institutions are endogenous to cultural values.10
Secondly, we contribute to the large literature on the political economy of deficit deter-
mination, as we identify a set of politicians’ and voters’ characteristics associated with larger
deficit bias.11 From a normative perspective, it is not obvious whether tight rules such as
a balanced budget requirement are optimal or not. As discussed above, restricting fiscal
policy is not the first best in standard macroeconomic models without political distortions.
However, restricting fiscal policy might become optimal when deficit is the suboptimal
result of the interplay between rational politicians, voters, and interest groups (such as the
aforementioned Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Persson and Svensson, 1989; Aghion and Bolton,
1990; Besley, 2007; Battaglini and Coate, 2008; Song, Soresletten and Zilibotti, 2012).12 These
models deliver different predictions on the types of polities where one should expect the
emergence of larger deficits. Our empirical findings shed new light on these dimensions.
1.3 Institutional framework
The Italian municipal government (Comune) is composed of a mayor (Sindaco), an executive
committee (Giunta) that is appointed by the mayor, and an elected city council (Consiglio
Comunale) that must endorse the annual budget proposed by the mayor. The mayor and
the executive committee—whose members can be dismissed by the mayor at will—propose
9Knight (2000) uses the difficulty of amending U.S. state constitutions as an instrument for analyzing the
effect of supermajority requirements for tax increases on tax rates.
10On the endogenous determination of laws, see Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) and Givati and Troiano
(2011). From a theoretical perspective, other authors analyze the welfare effect of fiscal restraints: Besley and
Smart (2007) study limits on the size of government in a two-period agency model; Bassetto and Sargent (2006)
study the welfare case for allowing the government to issue debt only to finance certain expenditures.
11This literature has been reviewed by Alesina and Perotti (1999).
12Other political economy models on deficit determination include Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Lizzeri
(1999), Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate (2008), and Yared (2010).
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changes in fiscal policy, such as adjustments in the tax rates. Subsequently, the city council
votes on the proposed changes. Since 1993, mayors are directly elected (with single round
plurality rule in cities below 15,000 inhabitants) and face a two-term limit. Municipalities
manage about 10 percent of total public expenditure and are in charge of a wide range
of services, including water supply, waste management, municipal police, infrastructures,
welfare, and housing. Only about 20 percent of revenues are local revenues.
After the European Union adopted its Stability and Growth Pact in 1997, some European
countries—including Italy—adopted subnational fiscal rules to keep local governments
accountable. In December 1998, the Italian annual budget law (Legge Finanziaria) for 1999
introduced a set of rules that constrained all municipalities in terms of fiscal discipline, the
aforementioned Domestic Stability Pact or DSP (Patto di Stabilità Interno).13
Municipal governments were constrained to keep the growth of their fiscal gap—defined
as deficit, net of transfers and debt service—under tight control. The rationale for the
exclusion of debt service and transfers in the definition of the DSP target is twofold.
First, mayors are not accountable for expenses on interests (which depend on previously
contracted loans) and for revenues from transfers (which are not raised by the municipality).
Second, these two items are the tools that the central government uses to enforce fiscal
rules, reducing interest payments for compliers and cutting transfers for non-compliers. The
punishment established for not complying with the DSP included the following penalties:
(i) 5 percent cut in the annual transfers from the central government; (ii) ban on municipal
hires; (iii) 30 percent cut on reimbursement and non-absenteeism bonuses for the employees
of the municipal administration. Cities complying with the DSP, instead, benefited from a
reduction of the expenses on interests for loans from the central government.14
13See Law 23 December 1998, no. 448, article 28.
14Consistently with the law, we compute fiscal gap with the formula: Fiscal Gap = (Total Expenditures - Debt
Service) - (Total Revenues - Transfers). See the Appendix Table A1 for more details on the definition of policy
outcomes. Unfortunately, the Ministry of the Interior does not release the list of municipalities that did not
comply with the rule according to its records. As discussed in Section 1.6.1, we find suggestive evidence that
the DSP penalties were enforced, as there is a correlation between non-compliance (as estimated in our data)
and lower transfers (which are the main DSP enforcement mechanism).
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The exact DSP rule constraining the fiscal gap changed from one year to another, but
over our sample period it consisted in imposing a cap on the growth rate of the gap. Table
1.3 summarizes the evolution of the DSP over our sample period.
Table 1.1: The rules of the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP)




1999 Fiscal gap: zero growth All
2000 Fiscal gap: zero growth All
2001 Fiscal gap: max 3% growth Above 5,000
2002 Fiscal gap: max 2.5% growth Above 5,000
2003 Fiscal gap: zero growth Above 5,000
2004 Fiscal gap: zero growth Above 5,000
Notes. The Domestic Stability Pact is a set of fiscal rules imposed by the central government to
discipline the fiscal management of local governments. The main target is the Fiscal gap (see
the Appendix Table A4 for details). The growth of fiscal gap with respect to its value two
budget years before is constrained to be either zero or below 2.5%/3% depending on the year
of the DSP. Legislative sources: annual national budget law (Legge Finanziaria) from 1999 to
2004.
The cap varies between a minimum of zero (no growth allowed) and a maximum of 3
percent, the benchmark being the fiscal gap two years before the actual budget year (this
means that, for instance, the growth rate in 2004 is calculated with respect to the fiscal gap
in 2002).
In evaluating the impact of the DSP on fiscal discipline, we therefore focus on the pattern
of both deficit and fiscal gap. Constrained and unconstrained municipalities can accumulate
debt, but if they run into fiscal distress they need to go through a special procedure of
budget consolidation (Piano di Risanamento). One possible concern can be that relaxing
fiscal rules induces expectations in our treated cities that they will be bailed out in case of
situations of fiscal distress.15 While we acknowledge the possibility that changes in fiscal
restraints can always be confounded with changes in expectations, both legal and anecdotal
evidence are consistent with the view that the Italian government made substantive effort to
keep expectations of bailing out as low as possible in the period of interest. In 2001, the
15In general, Italian municipalities can finance their debt through the emission of bonds (Buoni Obbligazionari
Comunali) or with loans from a central administrative agency (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti) and from private banks.
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Italian Constitution undertook a substantial revision that tried to introduce a higher degree
of fiscal decentralization while making bailouts unconstitutional.16
After 2001, all municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants were exempted by the DSP.17 The
motivation for this exemption was not made explicit by the central government, but it is
probably linked to the goal of providing some relief to small municipalities in the presence
of economies of scale in managing the municipal government. Fiscal rules, however, are
not the only policy varying with population size at 5,000. In particular, at this cutoff, there
is a sharp increase in the wage received by the mayor and by the other members of the
executive committee, based on a remuneration policy that has been in place since the early
1960s. Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2012) show that the wage increase at 5,000 attracts
more educated individuals into politics and improves their performance once elected. Table
1.2 summarizes all the Italian policies on municipal governments relying on population
thresholds over our sample period.
Population size determines the size of the city council; the size of the executive committee;
the electoral rule; and whether a municipality can have additional elective bodies at the
neighborhood level. But only the DSP (after 2001) and the salary of local politicians display
a discontinuity at the 5,000 cutoff.
In 2002, regions with special autonomy (Regioni a Statuto Speciale) were allowed to set
their own fiscal rules for municipal governments, and this is why we do not consider these
regions in our study. Furthermore, since 2005 fiscal rules have been frequently changing
from one year to another, shifting the population cutoff from 5,000 to 3,000 and back, and
replacing the fiscal gap requirement with expenditure caps in some years. This is the reason
why we focus our empirical evaluation on the period from 1997 to 2004.
16The new article 119 of the Italian Constitution specifically forbids the increase of governmental transfers to
local governments in fiscal distress. Anecdotal evidence confirms a hard-line stance by the central government
toward indebted municipalities. For instance, Taranto, a medium sized Italian city, declared bankruptcy in 2006;
local newspapers reporting on the fiscal situation of the city (e.g., see Taranto Sera) stressed how the city had to
undertake a multi-year repayment plan, without any help from the central government, and, after six years,
almost half of the debt was still outstanding; public services and wage of public employees were suspended for
some months after the bankruptcy, and local tax rates were significantly raised.
17See Law 23 December 2000, no. 388, article 53.
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Table 1.2: Legislative thresholds for Italian municipalities, 1997–2004
Population Wage of Wage of Size of Size of Electoral
mayor executive executive city rule
committee committee council
Below 1,000 1,291 15% 4 12 single
1,000-3,000 1,446 20% 4 12 single
3,000-5,000 2,169 20% 4 16 single
5,000-10,000 2,789 50% 4 16 single
10,000-15,000 3,099 55% 6 20 single
15,000-30,000 3,099 55% 6 20 runoff
30,000-50,000 3,460 55% 6 30 runoff
50,000-100,000 4,132 75% 6 30 runoff
100,000-250,000 5,010 75% 10 40 runoff
250,000-500,000 5,784 75% 12 46 runoff
Above 500,000 7,798 75% 14-16 50-60 runoff
Notes. Policies varying at different legislative thresholds in the period 1999–2004. Population is the number of
resident inhabitants as measured by the last available Census. Wage of mayor andWage of executive committee refer
to the monthly gross wage of the mayor and the members of the executive committee, respectively; the latter is
expressed as a percentage of the former, which refers to 2000 and is measured in Euros. Size of executive committee
is the maximum allowed number of executives appointed by the mayor. Size of city council is the number of seats
in the city council. The wage thresholds at 1,000 and 10,000 were introduced in 2000; all of the other thresholds
date back to 1960. Since 1993, the Electoral rule for the mayor is plurality with either single round or runoff.
In the next section, we explain how we exploit these unique Italian institutions to identify
the effect of fiscal restraints on fiscal discipline.
1.4 Difference-in-discontinuities design
1.4.1 Setup
Define Yit(1) and Yit(0) as the potential policy outcomes of municipality i at time t in
the case of treatment (Dit = 1) and no treatment (Dit = 0), respectively. Because of the
institutions described above, the treatment Dit coincides with “relaxing fiscal rules.” If
t   t0, only municipalities below the population cutoff pc are treated; the running variable
pi is set at the Census level and therefore time-invariant. Formally, treatment assignment is
given by:
Dit =
8><>: 1 if pi  pc, t   t00 otherwise. (1.1)




E[Zit|pi = p, t   t0] and Z+ ⌘ limp!p+c E[Zit|pi = p, t   t0], with Z = Y(1),Y(0),D,Y,
where Y is the observed policy outcome. Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) de-
rive precise conditions under which the cross-sectional RD estimator after t0, defined as
tˆRD = Y   Y+, identifies the average treatment effect at the cutoff, E[Yit(1) Yit(0)|p = pc].
The identifying assumptions require Dit to be independent of Yit(1) Yit(0) conditional on pi
near pc, and potential outcomes to be continuous at pc: Y(1)  = Y(1)+ and Y(0)  = Y(0)+.
In our setting, as it is often the case when different policies share the same cutoff, the
above continuity assumptions break down, because also politicians’ wages sharply change
at pc. Define: g1 ⌘ Y(1)   Y(1)+ 6= 0; g0 ⌘ Y(0)   Y(0)+ 6= 0. Here, g1 and g0 capture
the effects of the confounding policy discontinuity on potential outcomes. As a result:
tˆRD ⌘ Y   Y+ = Y(1)   Y(0)+ = Y(1)   Y(0) +Y(0)   Y(0)+ ⌘ NATT+ g0, (1.2)
or equivalently
tˆRD ⌘ Y   Y+ = Y(1)   Y(0)+ = Y(1)+ Y(0)+ +Y(1)   Y(1)+ ⌘ NATU+g1, (1.3)
where we define NATT as the Neighborhood Average Treatment effect on the Treated
(i.e., on units below pc) and NATU as the Neighborhood Average Treatment effect on the
Untreated (i.e., on units above pc).18 Only when g1 = g0, the two estimands are equal and
represent the Neighborhood Average Treatment Effect (NATE), E[Yit(1)  Yit(0)|p = pc],
which is the standard estimand identified in regression discontinuity design.
1.4.2 Identification
We now show how to overcome the identification problem discussed above. Information
on the pre-treatment period (t < t0) allows us to remove the bias under local assumptions.
Analogously to the post-treatment period, define: Z˜  ⌘ lim
p!p c
E[Zit|pi = p, t < t0] and
Z˜+ ⌘ lim
p!p+c
E[Zit|pi = p, t < t0], with Z = Y(1),Y(0),Y. To identify the causal effect
18In words, the NATT (NATU) captures the effect of relaxing fiscal rules for municipalities just below (above)
pc. Because the running variable pi is time-invariant, with a slight abuse of notation, we define observations
below pc as “treated” and above as “untreated” (although they are actually so only after t0).
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of relaxing fiscal rules, we exploit both the (sharp) discontinuous variation at pc and the
outcome time variation after t0:
tˆDD ⌘ (Y   Y+)  (Y˜    Y˜+). (1.4)
We call tˆDD “difference-in-discontinuities” estimator (shortly, diff-in-disc), because it rests
on the intuition of combining a difference-in-differences strategy and an RD design.
Alternative approaches in the literature have exploited the longitudinal nature of the
data in a regression discontinuity setup, such as the fixed-effect RD estimator in Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012), the first-difference RD estimator in Lemieux and Milligan (2008), or the
dynamic RD design in Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2011). All of these estimators,
however, are different from ours. In their setups, treatment assignment changes over time
and identification rests on within-unit variation, while in our case the running variable
is time-invariant. We are aware that other empirical studies implement some type of diff-
in-disc strategy, but in this section we provide precise identification assumptions for the
approach.19
Assumption 1 The effect of the confounding policy discontinuity is constant over time: Y(0)   
Y(0)+ = Y˜(0)    Y˜(0)+.
Result 1 Under Assumption 1, the diff-in-disc estimator identifies the NATT.
Proof 1 tˆDD ⌘ (Y   Y+)  (Y˜    Y˜+) = (Y(1)   Y(0) ) + (Y(0)   Y(0)+)  (Y˜(0)   
Y˜(0)+) = Y(1)   Y(0)  = NATT.
Assumption 1 can be interpreted from two perspectives. First, it is similar to the
RD assumption that potential outcomes are continuous, as it states that the difference in
Yit(0) before and after t0 is continuous at Pc. If the standard continuity assumption holds,
Assumption 1 is also met and the diff-in-disc estimator should simply be used as a robustness
19Our econometric strategy also relates to evaluation designs that exploit the comparison between different
discontinuities across space, such as in different U.S. states (see Dickert-Conlin and Elder, 2010) or for politicians
facing different term limits (see Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013).
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check for the standard RD design. But if the standard continuity assumption does not hold,
as in our setting, Assumption 1 could still be met and provide the basis for identification
under diff-in-disc. In Section 1.6, we validate the plausibility of this assumption by checking
whether any manipulation of the running variable changes (or arises) over time.20
From a second perspective, Assumption 1 requires the effect of the confounding policy
discontinuity not to vary with time. In other words, it requires observations just below
and just above pc to be on a common trend. This is similar to the standard identifying
assumption for difference-in-differences but is more local in nature, as it must be met only
in a neighborhood of the policy cutoff. To test for (local) common trend, in Section 1.6, we
estimate the pattern of discontinuities in Yit before t0 and we provide on how the regression
discontinuity point estimates evolve over time.
Notice that the NATT is local in a twofold manner, because it involves the subpopulation
hit by the interaction of two policies: the treatment and the confounding policy discontinuity.
In our case, it captures the effect of relaxing fiscal rules for mayors with a lower wage.
Under an additional homogeneity assumption, the diff-in-disc estimator identifies the
NATE, which is the standard estimand in cross-sectional RD.
Assumption 2 The effect of the confounding policy discontinuity is the same with and without
treatment: Y(1)   Y(1)+ = Y(0)   Y(0)+.
Result 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the diff-in-disc estimator identifies the NATE.
Proof 2 Because of Assumption 1, tˆDD = NATT. Because of Assumption 2, NATT ⌘ Y(1)   
Y(0)  = Y(1)+   Y(0)+ ⌘ NATU. Therefore: NATT = NATU = NATE.
Assumption 2 states that there must be no interaction between the treatment and the
confounding policy discontinuity, and is similar to the additivity condition in difference-
20Specifically, we extend the cross-sectional test of continuity of the density at pc (see McCrary, 2008) to test
for the continuity of the difference in the densities before and after t0. We also implement diff-in-disc estimations
with time-invariant characteristics as outcomes, so as to indirectly test for changes in the pattern of manipulative
sorting. As a further check in this direction, we include time-invariant characteristics and year fixed effects as
covariates in the baseline diff-in-disc estimations; in the absence of manipulative sorting, point estimates are
expected to remain similar and accuracy to increase.
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in-differences (see Angrist and Krueger, 1998). In our institutional setting, this assumption
would be violated if mayors just below and above pc, who are paid differently, reacted
to fiscal rules in a different way. In Section 1.6, under the maintained hypothesis that
Assumption 1 holds, we directly test this second assumption exploiting the introduction of
fiscal rules for all municipalities in 1999. In fact, if Assumption 2 holds, a falsification test
implementing the diff-in-disc estimator in 1999 should deliver a zero effect.
1.4.3 Estimation
The diff-in-disc estimator can be implemented by estimating the boundary points of four
regression functions of Yit on pi: two on both sides of pc, before and after t0. We borrow two
different estimation methods from the RD literature for this purpose: local linear regression
and spline polynomial approximation.21
The first method fits linear regression functions to the observations distributed within a
distance h on either side of pc, both before and after t0. Formally, we restrict the sample to
cities in the interval pi 2 [pc   h, pc + h] and estimate the model:
Yit = d0 + d1P⇤i + Ji(g0 + g1P⇤i ) + Tt[a0 + a1P⇤i + Ji(b0 + b1P⇤i )] + xit, (1.5)
where Ji is a dummy for cities below 5,000, Tt an indicator for the post-treatment period,
and P⇤i = pi   pc the normalized population size. Standard errors are clustered at the city
level. The coefficient b0 is the diff-in-disc estimator and identifies the treatment effect of
relaxing fiscal rules, as the treatment is Dit = Ji · Tt. As suggested by Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and due to a lack of consensus on how to choose an optimal bandwidth, we present
the robustness of our results to multiple bandwidths h.
The second method uses all observations and chooses a flexible functional form to fit




















21See Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Van der Klaauw (2008), and Lee and Lemieux (2010).
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Again, standard errors are clustered at the city level, and the coefficient b0 is the diff-in-disc
estimator identifying the treatment effect of relaxing fiscal rules. We present the robustness
of our results to multiple orders of the polynomial approximation (q).
1.5 Data
We use administrative data from the Italian Ministry of the Interior (Ministero dell’Interno)
containing information at the municipality level on the universe of municipal financial
reports, municipal tax rates, electoral outcomes, and individual characteristics of the mayor.
Based on the local nature of our diff-in-disc design, we restrict the sample to Italian
municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants.22
Table 1.3: The rules of the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP)




1999 Fiscal gap: zero growth All
2000 Fiscal gap: zero growth All
2001 Fiscal gap: max 3% growth Above 5,000
2002 Fiscal gap: max 2.5% growth Above 5,000
2003 Fiscal gap: zero growth Above 5,000
2004 Fiscal gap: zero growth Above 5,000
Notes. The Domestic Stability Pact is a set of fiscal rules imposed by the central government to
discipline the fiscal management of local governments. The main target is the Fiscal gap (see
the Appendix Table A4 for details). The growth of fiscal gap with respect to its value two
budget years before is constrained to be either zero or below 2.5%/3% depending on the year
of the DSP. Legislative sources: annual national budget law (Legge Finanziaria) from 1999 to
2004.
For the reason discussed in Section 1.3, we drop municipalities in regions with special
autonomy. This leaves us with a final sample of 1,050 municipalities for a total of 6,300
observations from 1999 to 2004. Among them, 555 municipalities are treated after 2001
(because they are below 5,000 inhabitants) and 495 are in the control group. Our sample
22We restrict the sample to the interval 3,500–7,000 to stay relatively far from the 3,000 threshold, where
other policies change (see Table 1.2), and to balance the sample size on either side of the 5,000 threshold. All
the results are robust to this interval choice, i.e., they are virtually unchanged for alternative choices, such as
3,250–6,750; 3,000–7,000; 3,500–6,500; 4,000–6,000; and 3,500–7,500 (available upon request).
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contains about 13 percent of all Italian municipalities and about 8 percent of the national
population.
The population size that decides treatment status is the 2001 Census. Because the
relaxation of the DSP was decided in December 2000, it is very unlikely that municipalities
had the time to influence their population and sort below the 5,000 threshold, and—on top
of this—it is also unlikely that elected officials wanted to do that at the price of cutting their
wage. In any case, in Section 1.6.2, we formally test for manipulative sorting below 5,000
before/after 2001 by comparing population size in the 1991 and 2001 Census.
The main variables of interest are the municipal financial report’s categories. To measure
fiscal discipline, we evaluate the deficit (total expenditures minus total revenues) and the
fiscal gap (total expenditures minus total revenues, net of transfers and debt service), which
is the target of the DSP. We divide expenditures into current outlays (including personnel
expenditure), capital outlays (mostly investments), and debt service; and we divide revenues
into municipal taxes, fees and tariffs, transfers from the central government, and other
revenues. The main tax instruments decided by municipal governments are the real estate
tax rate on home property (ICI), providing about 50 percent of their tax revenues, and the
municipal surcharge on the personal income tax (IRPEF), amounting to about 10 percent of
tax revenues.23 See the Appendix Table A1 for precise definitions and data sources of all
variables from municipal financial reports.
One possible concern in evaluating the reaction of policies and tax instruments to
fiscal rules might be that mayors have very little autonomy in adjusting local revenues or
expenditure, but this is not the case for Italian municipalities. On the revenues side, over
our sample period, mayors could vary ICI within a bracket from 0.4 to 0.7 percent of the
legal home value, and the IRPEF surcharge within a bracket from 0 to 0.5 percent of taxable
income.24 And they were also free to set other local taxes (such as those on building rights
23Bordignon, Nannicini, and Tabellini (2012) also use ICI as the main policy tool of Italian municipalities.
24One additional concern can be that mayors comply with the rule by simply manipulating legal home value.
However, legal home value is not determined or updated by mayors, as indicated by the DPR 22 December
1986, no. 917. Only in 2005, not in our sample, the Law 23 December 2005, no. 266 gave to municipalities some
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or the occupation of public areas), or fees and tariffs for the services they provided (such
as waste management or child care). Additionally, Italian towns are characterized by a
sizable level of tax evasion, which the mayor can decide to fight.25 On the expenditures side,
municipalities also have room for adjustment because about one third of the expenditures
are classified as not rigid (that is, not attributable to payroll expenses and debt service).
For instance, one way to reduce expenditures without affecting the level of services is
outsourcing (e.g., child care provided by private firms with more labor flexibility and lower
costs although the financing remains public). Furthermore, Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti
(2009) show how similar Italian municipalities can pay very differently for similar goods,
and they interpret this as evidence of passive waste. This implies that, even if all current
expenditures were rigid (and this is not certainly the case), mayors would still have the
ability to reduce passive waste in order to adjust the fiscal gap.
Our dataset also contains time-invariant information on each municipality (geographic
location, area size in km2, sea level in meters), as well as time-varying information on the
elected mayor (age, years of schooling, tenure in office, term limit), on the socio-economic
environment (taxable income of resident inhabitants, age structure of the population), and
on the political environment (number of political parties seating in the city council). See
again the Appendix Table A1 for their description and sources.
Table 1.4 provides descriptive statistics on the main outcome variables (policy outcomes
and tax instruments) for cities below and above 5,000 inhabitants. All variables are per
capita and expressed in real terms (with 2009 as base year); tax rates are in percentage points.
Municipalities below (above) 5,000 manage an annual budget equal to almost 1,041 (943)
Euros per capita in terms of expenditures, and the deficit amounts to about 15 (11) Euros.
Taxes are only slightly lower than 20 percent of total revenues and higher in municipalities
above 5,000. The main tax rates on ICI and the IRPEF surcharge, however, are fairly similar
weak power of requesting the update of the assessed value of the real estate tax base.
25Casaburi and Troiano (2012) find that in 2007 over 2 millions of Italian buildings were not registered in the
cadastral maps and thus were not part of the tax base for real estate and income tax.
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for municipalities in the two groups.
Table 1.4: Outcome variables, descriptive statistics
Municipalities Municipalities
above 5,000 below 5,000
A. Fiscal discipline
Deficit 11.080 15.457
Fiscal gap 170.724 208.624
B. Expenditures
Current outlays 475.312 502.181
Capital outlays 438.838 508.794
Debt service 29.139 30.107
C. Revenues
Taxes 194.887 175.825
Fees & tariffs 56.601 58.938
Central transfers 188.783 223.274
Other revenues 491.938 567.589
D. Tax instruments
Real estate tax rate 0.587 0.576
Income tax surcharge 0.309 0.309
Obs. 2,970 3,330
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1999
and 2004. The average values of per-capita policy outcomes are in 2009 Euros. The real
estate tax rate and the income tax surcharge are in percentage points; the former can
vary from 0.4 to 0.7 percent; the latter can vary from 0 to 0.5 percent.
As a benchmark, note that applying a difference-in-differences strategy to our dataset
delivers the expected result: relaxing fiscal rules increases the deficit by 6.276 Euros and the
fiscal gap by 48.278 Euros in a specification without municipality fixed effects, and by 5.279
and 16.669 with fixed effects, where both estimates on deficit are statistically significant at a
5 percent level and those on fiscal gap at a 1 percent level. However, in the next section, we
discuss the results of our diff-in-disc design, which provides more credible evidence on the
impact of relaxing fiscal rules on fiscal discipline for the reasons discussed above.
1.6 Empirical results
1.6.1 Effect of relaxing fiscal rules on policy outcomes
Table 1.5 contains the main (diff-in-disc) estimation results. For each outcome variable,
we show the robustness of the results to four estimation methods: local linear regression
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as in equation (1.5) with two different bandwidths (i.e., 500 and 750); spline polynomial
approximation as in equation (1.6) with two different orders of the polynomial (i.e., 3rd and
4th).26 The main outcomes of interest are the two measures of fiscal discipline: deficit and
fiscal gap (see panel A of the table). While the latter is the main target of the DSP, we believe
that the former should be the real variable of policy interest.
The impact of relaxing rules on the deficit is positive and significant both in statistical
and in economic terms. The DSP relaxation increases deficit by about 20 Euros per capita
with respect to a baseline situation of balanced budget. The deficit bias created by the
relaxation of the DSP is also substantial from an economic point of view, as it amounts to
about 2 percent of total expenditures. This effect is driven by a higher fiscal gap of about 40
to 60 percent, depending on the empirical specification. Both these effects are statistically
significant at standard levels in all specifications, and the point estimates of the deficit are
somehow more stable than those of fiscal gap.
These estimation results on fiscal discipline are consistent with the descriptive graphs
shown in Figure 1.1 , where in the top panel we draw scatters and (3rd-order) polynomial
fits of the differences between each post-2001 outcome value and each pre-2001 value.
These graphs allow us to see whether those differences exhibit a discontinuity at the 5,000
threshold. We see that both variables measuring fiscal discipline exhibit a sharp jump when
moving from the left to the right of the threshold in the whole sample (top left graph in
both figures). Furthermore, in the other graphs in the bottom panel, we shed some light on
the timing of the effect to provide evidence that high and low paid mayors were on parallel
trends around the neighborhood of the 5,000 threshold. The evidence is consistent for both
deficit and fiscal gap, as there is a change in the slope of the coefficients only after 2001. The
observed discontinuities, however, remain statistically significant for all years.27
In panels B and C of Table 1.5, we assess whether the fiscal (de)stabilization takes place
26Results are robust to the use of additional bandwidths (i.e., 250 and 1,000) or additional orders of the
polynomial (i.e., 2nd and 5th) and are available upon request. We use the two estimation methods that are
standard in the RD literature. However, to address concerns about the sensitivity of our results to functional
form assumptions, we also repeated the analysis implementing a simple t-test of the difference-in-discontinuities
in closed intervals around the threshold (with intervals getting smaller and smaller) and we always obtained a
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Notes. For the Difference-in-discontinuities graphs. Vertical axis: difference of each post-rule (i.e. 2001, 2002, 2003,
and 2004) outcome value and each pre-rule (i.e. 1999 and 2000) outcome value. Horizontal axis: actual population size
minus 5,000. The central line is a spline 3rd-order polynomial fit; the lateral lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50 inhabitants. For the Yearly RD coefficients. Vertical axis: point estimate
of a LLR regression with optimal bandwidth computed following the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2012) algorithm.
Horizontal axis: year. The central line is the point estimate; the lateral lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
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on the side of revenues or expenditure. While we cannot find a statistically significant
impact on current outlays, capital outlays, and debt service, we find that tax revenues are
lower by 20 to 45 percent in unconstrained municipalities (with respect to the average value
of the control group and depending on the specification). Lower tax revenues are the result
of lower tax rates decided by the municipal government (see panel D of Table 1.5). Cities
for which fiscal rules are relaxed have a lower real estate tax rate by 14 percent and a lower
income tax surcharge by 30 percent. Other revenues do not seem to be affected by the
relaxation of fiscal restraints.28
In Figure 1.3 we confirm that the common trend assumption is satisfied also for all our
other financial reports’ items.
Also on the side of revenues, central transfers seem to be higher for unconstrained
municipalities, although point estimates are not always statistically significant. This result
cannot explain the above impact of relaxing fiscal rules on fiscal discipline because it
goes in the opposite direction (that is, local governments running higher deficits receive
larger transfers), and it is consistent with the design of the law, which allows the central
government to cut transfers as an enforcement mechanism. This conjecture is consistent with
our data. Although the Italian government did not release the official list of complying and
non-complying municipalities, we can estimate compliance status in every year by applying
the official rule summarized in Table 1.3 to our data. We find that complying municipalities
amount to 68 percent of the total, and non-complying municipalities are also present around
the 5,000 threshold, where the estimated compliance status shows a sharp discontinuity
difference statistically different from zero (results available upon request).
27The yearly diff-in-disc estimates for 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 confirm the above graphical evidence on the
timing of the effect of relaxing fiscal rules on fiscal discipline (available upon request).
28Other revenues include transfers from the European Union, other transfers, mortgages from administrative
agencies, revenues coming from private properties owned by the municipality. Even if the standard errors for
other revenues are bigger than the rest of our variables, visual inspection of the corresponding graph in Figure
1.2 reveals that standard errors are driven up by an outlier in this category. Repeating our analysis without this
outlier consistently reduces the standard errors without affecting the other outcomes (results available upon
request).
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Notes. Vertical axis: difference of each post-2001 (i.e. 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004) outcome value and each pre-2001 (i.e.
1999 and 2000) outcome value. Horizontal axis: actual population size minus 5,000. The central line is a spline 3rd-order
polynomial fit; the lateral lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50
inhabitants.
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Notes. Vertical axis: point estimate of a LLR regression with optimal bandwidth computed following the Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2012) algorithm. Horizontal axis: year. The central line is the point estimate; the lateral lines
represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Table 1.5: The effect of relaxing fiscal rules, diff-in-disc estimates
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
A. Fiscal discipline
Deficit 17.358** 19.234*** 21.449** 25.109**
(8.377) (6.256) (9.485) (12.756)
Fiscal gap 61.748* 57.839** 102.202*** 108.128**
(32.584) (25.016) (38.463) (48.372)
B. Expenditures
Current outlays -52.570 -4.208 -32.366 -60.520
(55.367) (36.093) (55.631) (77.460)
Capital outlays 42.331 44.482 91.321 202.679
(87.304) (63.528) (103.145) (140.024)
Debt service -1.851 -1.593 -2.338 -2.375
(6.895) (4.176) (6.631) (9.675)
C. Revenues
Taxes -45.248* -36.779* -57.028** -85.077**
(25.980) (19.185) (27.193) (35.162)
Fees & tariffs -3.359 0.100 1.173 -4.051
(10.214) (7.416) (10.601) (13.910)
Central transfers 42.539 37.012 78.414** 80.644*
(30.020) (23.104) (35.334) (43.517)
Other revenues -23.380 19.114 12.608 123.159
(108.275) (72.838) (118.470) (165.666)
D. Tax instruments
Real estate tax rate -0.040* -0.028 -0.056** -0.060*
(0.024) (0.018) (0.026) (0.033)
Income tax surcharge -0.036 -0.057** -0.058 -0.111**
(0.036) (0.029) (0.041) (0.051)
Obs. 2,080 3,068 6,300 6,300
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1999 and 2004. Diff-in-disc estimates
of the impact of relaxing fiscal rules on policy outcomes and tax instruments below 5,000 after 2001. Estimation
methods: Local Linear Regression (LLR) with bandwidth h = 500 or h = 750, as in equation (1.5); spline polynomial
approximation with 3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial, as in equation (1.6). All policy outcomes are per capita and in
2009 Euros. Tax instruments are in percentage points. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are
in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
of about 40 percent.29 Future transfers appear to be strongly correlated with compliance
status: in a specification that controls for year fixed effects, central transfers are larger by
about 10.329 Euros per capita (standard error, 3.303) for complying municipalities.30 This
evidence is consistent with the institutional details discussed in Section 1.3, according to
29Specifically, if we repeat our RD estimations using compliance status as a dependent variable, we obtain
the following results for local linear regression (h = 500, h = 750) and spline polynomial approximation (3rd
and 4th order), respectively: 0.450 (standard error, 0.070); 0.443 (0.054); 0.448 (0.076); 0.436 (0.096).
30Results are robust to the use of municipality fixed effects.
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which central transfers are used as the main enforcement device of the DSP.
Figure 1.2 provides graphical evidence on the diff-in-disc jumps at the 5,000 threshold
in the policy outcomes and tax instruments. Consistently with the estimation results, tax
revenues, ICI, and IRPEF show significant and negative jumps moving from just above to
just below the 5,000 residents threshold. The graphs on expenditures confirm that these
variables are reasonably stable across the threshold, even if the size of the standard errors in
Table 1.5 does not allow us to reach a definitive conclusion on the possibility that a fraction
of the adjustment also takes place through expenditures.
The previous results suggest that the fiscal adjustment mainly takes place on revenues.
There are (at least) two possible explanations that can rationalize this finding. On the one
hand, politicians might have a hard time convincing interest groups to cut expenditures,
while taxpayers are more prone to internal free-riding and do not self-organize (see Olson,
1965). On the other hand, tax increases might be less salient than expenditure cuts for
individuals (see Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 2009) and thus they might be easier to adopt (or
revert) for politicians.
1.6.2 Validity tests
As discussed in Section 1.4, the above estimation results rest on Assumption 1 and Assump-
tion 2 for the identification of different average treatment effects in the neighborhood of
the population threshold. In this section, we indirectly evaluate Assumption 1 by means of
testing procedures aimed at detecting changes in manipulative sorting before/after 2001,
and we directly test Assumption 2 in the falsification test that uses pre-treatment data.
The Appendix Figure A1 tests the null hypothesis of continuity of the difference in the
density at 5,000 between the 1991 and the 2001 Census (top graph), by drawing both scatters
and (3rd-order) polynomial fits. If mayors were able to manipulate population size and sort
below the threshold to avoid fiscal rules, our estimates would still suffer from the selection
bias that was common in the previous empirical literature. However, in principle, there
is very little room for differential manipulation between the two Censuses, because (i) the
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DSP is only enacted in December 2000, (ii) the Census is run independently by the National
Statistical Office, so that false reporting should be ruled out, and (iii) mayors willing to sort
below 5,000 to enjoy a relaxation of fiscal rules would pay the price of cutting their wage.
Nevertheless, it might still be the case that some municipalities under financial stress tried to
sort below 5,000 moving from the 1991 to the 2001 Census, by forcing some residents to leave
or (more plausibly) not counter-reacting to population drops. Yet, the top graph in Figure
A1 is reassuring about the absence of manipulation, as there is no jump in the difference
between the two densities. The point estimate from the spline polynomial approximation
is equal to -0.078 (standard error, 0.114) and therefore is not statistically different from
zero. For the sake of completeness, we also report the cross-sectional density tests for 1991
(bottom left) and 2001 (bottom right). Also there, there is no evidence of manipulation.31
Furthermore, in the Appendix Table A2, we check for the balancing of time-invariant
characteristics by including covariates, together with year fixed effects, in the baseline
diff-in-disc estimations; as expected, point estimates remain almost unchanged and accuracy
increases. The Appendix Table A3 further evaluates the absence of manipulation. We
implement diff-in-disc estimations with time-invariant characteristics (geographic location,
area size, and sea level) as outcome variables, but we use changing population numbers:
the 1991 Census before the treatment year, and the 2001 Census afterwards. This is meant to
assess whether the fraction of cities with certain fixed characteristics just below or above 5,000
varies from 1991 to 2001. No time-invariant characteristics display a statistically significant
jump.32 We think that geographical location is a particularly interesting dimension here,
31The 1991 point estimate is 0.068 (0.082); the 2001 point estimate is -0.010 (0.076).
32As an additional check, in the Appendix Table A4, we report balance tests of potentially endogenous
characteristics. We implement diff-in-disc estimations with some (time-varying) economic or political character-
istics of the municipality as outcome variables, using the 2001 Census population as the running variable as in
the baseline specifications for the main policy outcomes. The time-varying characteristics we control for are
the taxable income at the municipality level; the mayor’s gender, years of schooling, and previous tenure in
office; as well as the dimension of heterogeneous treatment effects we study in the next section (namely, term
limit, number of parties, young cohorts, and speed of public good provision). These outcomes are potentially
endogenous to the DSP, but detecting significant effects would disclose unexpected channels of adjustment
through income, political selection, or public good delivery. This does not seem to be the case, as also these
potentially endogenous variables are balanced around 5,000 before/after 2001.
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because Italian geography is correlated with economic development, crime rates, labor
market shirking, or political accountability (e.g., see Ichino and Maggi, 2000; Nannicini,
Stella, Tabellini, and Troiano, 2012), and it could thus be associated with opportunistic
manipulation too.
Based on this large amount of supporting evidence on Assumption 1, in Table 1.6 we
directly test for Assumption 2 under the maintained hypothesis that Assumption 1 holds.
In particular, we check whether cities just below or just above the 5,000 threshold respond
differently to fiscal rules. We use the introduction of the DSP in 1999 for all municipalities as
an experiment to test for the absence of any differential response around 5,000. Specifically,
we implement diff-in-disc estimations in the interval 1997–2000, using 1999–2000 as the
post-treatment period and 1997–1998 as the pre-treatment period.33 All outcome variables
are perfectly balanced around the threshold before/after 1999, confirming the assumption
that there is no interaction between the DSP and the confounding wage discontinuity.34
Finally, we perform a set of placebo tests to evaluate the possibility that our results arise
from random chance rather than a causal relationship. In the Appendix Figure A2 and
Figure A3, in the spirit of DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2012), we implement—respectively
for deficit and for fiscal gap—a set of diff-in-disc estimations at false population thresholds
below and above the 5,000 threshold (namely, any point from 4,900 to 4,400 and from 5,100
to 5,600 in order to stay sufficiently away from the true policy threshold). At these false
thresholds, we expect to find no systematic evidence of treatment effects similar to our
baseline results. The two figures report the cumulative density function of these 1,000
placebo point estimates (using a specification with 3rd-order spline polynomial), normalized
33The city of Romentino was an outlier due to a lucrative sale of land in 1998 and it was removed from the
sample. Our results do not change with the inclusion of this city, with the exception of bigger standard errors
for other revenues (available upon request).
34This falsification test suggests that the rule did not bind differently across the different sides of the
population cutoff. We perform an additional robustness check by repeating yearly diff-in-disc estimations
considering the last pre-treatment year, 2000, as the baseline year. As expected, none of the pre-treatment
coefficients, from 1997 to 1999, is statistically different from the 2000 coefficient, while there is a sizable jump of
the post-treatment coefficients (i.e., 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004). This robustness check indirectly controls also
for anticipation effects and for idiosyncratic variation in each single year (available upon request).
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Table 1.6: Falsification test in 1999
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
A. Fiscal discipline
Deficit 1.303 -4.735 0.942 -1.520
(7.604) (7.402) (8.997) (10.673)
Fiscal gap 2.425 5.151 12.440 -2.693
(11.158) (8.836) (11.882) (15.294)
B. Expenditures
Current outlays -2.027 -8.305 -11.384 -6.307
(9.365) (8.724) (10.605) (11.584)
Capital outlays 0.528 -35.770 -13.273 -93.598
(52.206) (45.759) (59.126) (98.401)
Debt service -0.220 -0.347 -0.786 0.368
(1.239) (1.058) (1.278) (1.591)
C. Revenues
Taxes -1.300 1.905 -3.411 -2.401
(4.024) (3.668) (4.270) (4.923)
Fees & tariffs 3.168 2.681 -0.654 0.241
(3.267) (3.222) (3.428) (3.490)
Central transfers -2.270 1.755 -3.298 -11.149
(6.449) (5.415) (7.187) (9.013)
Other revenues 34.986 -11.711 27.041 -62.725
(38.066) (32.788) (43.639) (86.491)
D. Tax instruments
Real estate tax rate 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Obs. 1,260 1,848 4,176 4,176
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1997 and 2001. Diff-in-disc estimates
of the (false) impact of introducing fiscal rules on policy outcomes below 5,000 after 1999 (when no discontinuity was
introduced by the DSP; see Table 1.3). Estimation methods: Local Linear Regression (LLR) with bandwidth h = 500 or
h = 750, as in equation (1.5); spline polynomial approximation with 3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial, as in equation
(1.6). All policy outcomes are per capita and in 2009 Euros. The real estate tax rate is in percentage points (the income
tax surcharge is not available for this test because it was introduced in 1999). Fiscal gap, Current outlays, Capital outlays,
and Debt service are not available in 1997; for these variables the observations in the four estimations, respectively, are:
945; 1,389; 3,135; 3,135. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at
the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
with respect to our baseline point estimates for deficit and fiscal gap. This means, for
instance, that a normalized coefficient of 80 stands for a placebo point estimate equal to
80 percent of the true baseline estimate at 5,000. The intuition here is that we should not
observe too many normalized coefficients outside the interval from -100 to +100. Indeed, all
of the placebo coefficients are below our estimated coefficients for both deficit and fiscal
gap, and the cumulative density function of the normalized coefficients is much steeper
around zero. Only 0.8 percent of the normalized placebo coefficients for deficit is bigger
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than the true coefficient in absolute value, while none of them is so for fiscal gap. On the
whole, these placebo tests provide strong support to the robustness of our main results on
fiscal discipline.
1.6.3 Political economy of fiscal adjustment
In this section, we exploit our research design to shed light on the political economy of deficit.
Evaluating the differential response of different politicians and voters to an exogenous (albeit
local) variation in fiscal rules, in fact, can identify important determinants of politically
motivated deficits and provide new evidence about the costs and benefits of fiscal restraints.
We start by looking at three political factors. First, we consider whether there are more than
two parties in the city council—which must approve the budget proposed by the mayor—to
capture political fragmentation and potential common pool problems. Second, we consider
whether mayors face a binding term limit or not, because mayors in their second term have
no reelection incentives and no personal stake in the city’s budget for the following years.
Third, we consider the age profile of citizens in our municipalities. We then relate our
findings to models that formalize the trade-off between reduced flexibility of fiscal policy
and increased discipline on politically motivated deficit. First, we consider the effort of the
mayor in providing the public good promised to voters in the provisional budget. Second,
we look at cities characterized by historical deficit versus those characterized by a cyclical
one.
Results for the first two variables are reported in Table 1.7, where we implement
the baseline diff-in-disc estimations in split samples: (i) two parties in the city council
(the median value) vs. more than two parties; (ii) binding vs. non-binding term limit.
For each heterogeneity exercise, we report the diff-in-disc estimates in the two (split)
subsamples, the difference between the two point estimates, as well as the Wald test p-value
indicating whether this difference is statistically different from zero. We are aware that,
while the point estimates in each subsample consistently identify local average treatment
effects, the causal interpretation of their difference rests on an additional conditional
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independence assumption. This is why we also report a second Wald test p-value (with
covariates) indicating whether this difference is robust to a specification including a full set
of interactions with covariates at the municipality level (namely, the average taxable income;
mayor’s years of schooling; and whether the municipality is in the North of the country).
If also this test is statistically significant, it means that the differential impact of relaxing
fiscal rules across our heterogeneity dimensions is not driven by other confounding city
characteristics.
First, we focus on political fragmentation. Political fragmentation generally arises
when several agents have an active role in the allocation of the budget, each with its own
constituency to please, and each with some weight in the final decision. There are two key
determinants that affect how much a policy maker internalizes the costs of the demanded
share of the budget: the number of decision makers participating in the bargaining process
and the institutional rules determining the aggregation of preferences. Most empirical
studies focus on the first determinant because of a lack of reliable proxies for the rules that
determine the budget allocation across countries. We also follow this previous literature
by focusing on the first determinant (see Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999). However, one
advantage of our setting is that we can safely assume that the rules that determine the
allocation of the budget are constant around our threshold. The estimation results reported
in Table 1.7 show that only municipalities with high political fragmentation react to the
relaxation of the DSP, and this result is robust to controlling for covariates. This result is
consistent with models that explain deficit in terms of political fragmentation or dynamic
common pool (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000) and also with the cross-country evidence
that coalition governments lead to higher deficits (see Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Kontopoulos
and Perotti, 1999).
Second, we focus on term limit, exploiting the fact that Italian mayors face a two-
term limit.35 Theoretical models suggest that the expectation of a future election can
35It should be noted that: (i) municipalities do not vote at the same time, and (ii) the DSP was independent
of local politics because it followed agreements between the European Union and its member countries.
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Table 1.7: The political economy of deficit bias, part I
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
With two parties or less:
Deficit 0.720 2.753 3.278 2.993
(9.511) (7.650) (10.369) (12.379)
Obs. 1,187 1,721 3,584 3,584
With more than two parties:
Deficit 44.096*** 42.958*** 50.869*** 69.627**
(15.429) (12.082) (19.446) (27.413)
Obs. 893 1,347 2,716 2,716
Difference between
the two subsamples 43.376 40.205 47.591 66.634
Wald test p-value
without covariates 0.034 0.015 0.022 0.044
Wald test p-value
with covariates 0.037 0.028 0.028 0.049
With binding term limit:
Deficit 0.967 7.861 4.017 5.598
(8.463) (6.957) (9.599) (12.083)
Obs. 920 1,375 2,780 2,780
Without binding term limit:
Deficit 29.531** 27.189*** 33.047** 36.640*
(13.120) (9.428) (14.471) (20.332)
Obs. 1,160 1,693 3,520 3,520
Difference between
the two subsamples 28.564 19.328 29.030 31.042
Wald test p-value
without covariates 0.071 0.088 0.090 0.189
Wald test p-value
with covariates 0.097 0.064 0.096 0.227
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1999 and 2004. Diff-in-disc estimates
of the impact of relaxing fiscal rules on fiscal discipline below 5,000 after 2001 in different subsamples (that is, above
vs. below median number of parties; binding vs. non-binding term limit). Estimation methods: Local Linear Regres-
sion (LLR) with bandwidth h = 500 or h = 750, as in equation (1.5); spline polynomial approximation with 3rd-order
or 4th-order polynomial, as in equation (1.6). The Wald test p-value without covariates evaluates whether the estimates
are statistically different in the two subsamples. The Wald test p-value with covariates evaluates whether the estimates
are statistically different in the two subsamples also controlling for a full set of interactions between the above spec-
ifications and appropriate covariates, such as: average taxable income; mayor’s years of schooling; and whether the
municipality is in the North. All variables are per capita and in 2009 Euros. Robust standard errors clustered at the
municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the
1% level by ***.
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affect policies because politicians who care to run again for office must please the voters
sufficiently often to merit reelection (Barro, 1973; Banks and Sundaram, 1998). We find
that the fiscal (de)stabilization induced by the relaxation of the fiscal restraints is driven by
mayors without a binding term limit, although this result becomes borderline insignificant
in some specifications that control for covariates. As mayors without term limit face both
stronger reelection concerns and a higher expected probability that they (or their party)
will remain in power, the above result provides more support for models linking deficit to
reelection incentives (see Aghion and Bolton, 1990) or to politicians’ pandering to voters
(see Maskin and Tirole, 2004), rather than models viewing deficit as a way to tie the hands
of future governments with different political preferences (see Alesina and Tabellini, 1990;
Persson and Svensson, 1989; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). Unfortunately, we are not able
to provide further empirical evidence on strategic voting models because of the lack of a
clear expected reelection probability outcome in our data.36 We are also not able to rule
out alternative channels that can rationalize our result on term limit, such as the possibility
that political experience per se has an effect on how mayors react to the relaxation of fiscal
rules, even if it is encouraging that some of the results survive to controlling for the mayor’s
characteristics.37
In Table 1.8, which has the same structure of Table 1.7, we report one additional
heterogeneity result along city characteristics. In particular, we implement the baseline
diff-in-disc estimations in two separate subsamples: cities with a higher (i.e., above-median)
fraction of young cohorts vs. the rest of the cities. Consistently with the model of Song,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012), deficit increases after the relaxation of the rule only in cities
with a larger proportion of young citizens. Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) propose a
dynamic politico-economic theory of fiscal policy for small open economies, and we view
this model as particularly relevant for our setting because small cities are a reasonably good
36See Petterson-Lidbom (2001) for an empirical evaluation of strategic voting models.
37Given that we can control for the selection of mayors (years of schooling), our findings provide additional
support to the literature that focuses on the effect of term limit on political accountability and in-office
performance (see Besley and Case, 1995; List and Sturm, 2006).
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approximation of small open economies. The main intuition of their model is that younger
citizens impose a disciplining effect on fiscal policy, because they internalize the future costs
of a loose fiscal policy today. Both of the above predictions are borne out by our empirical
findings.38
Table 1.8: The political economy of deficit bias, part II
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
Young cohorts above median:
Deficit 0.887 8.110 7.094 4.151
(10.509) (7.753) (11.067) (14.635)
Obs. 1,059 1,561 3,224 3,244
Young cohorts below median:
Deficit 35.523*** 31.244*** 36.913*** 49.481***
(12.010) (9.390) (14.255) (18.795)
Obs. 1,021 1,507 3,076 3,076
Difference between
the two subsamples 34.636 23.134 29.819 45.330
Wald test p-value
without covariates 0.024 0.050 0.082 0.041
Wald test p-value
with covariates 0.052 0.068 0.156 0.048
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1999 and 2004. Diff-in-disc estimates
of the impact of relaxing fiscal rules on fiscal discipline below 5,000 after 2001 in different subsamples (that is, above
vs. below median percentage of young cohorts). Estimation methods: Local Linear Regression (LLR) with bandwidth
h = 500 or h = 750, as in equation (1.5); spline polynomial approximation with 3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial,
as in equation (1.6). The Wald test p-value without covariates evaluates whether the estimates are statistically different
in the two subsamples. The Wald test p-value with covariates evaluates whether the estimates are statistically different
in the two subsamples also controlling for a full set of interactions between the above specifications and appropriate
covariates, such as: average taxable income; mayor’s years of schooling; and whether the municipality is in the North.
All variables are per capita and in 2009 Euros. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in
parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
Finally, we move to relating our results to existing models that formalize the costs and
benefits of restraining fiscal policy. Besley (2007) considers fiscal rules that increase the cost
of issuing public debt in an environment characterized by two types of politicians, the ones
who care about smoothing busyness cycle fluctuations and those who care about reelection.
38Another testable prediction of their model is that deficit bias should be higher for cities where the mayor is
affiliated with right-wing parties. While most of the mayors in our sample are not affiliated with parties that
can be clearly mapped to the ideological spectrum, we also find evidence that is consistent with this prediction
in the (small) subset of mayors affiliated to a political party (results available upon request).
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Rules that are not overly restrictive will bind more on bad politicians and increase voters’
welfare. In Table 1.9, we split the sample based on the median of the speed of public good
provision (measured as the ratio of paid outlays over the total outlays committed in the
provisional budget). Our indicator of the speed of public good provision is calculated
as a mayor-specific measure, averaged across all the years each mayor is in office. The
results show that the increase in deficit bias arises only for mayors that systematically
under-provide the public good promised to voters in the provisional budget. This evidence
can be interpreted as consistent with a potential negative effect for voters following the
relaxation of the rule, only to the extent to which politicians who consistently over-promise
public goods are those who care more about reelection rather than social welfare.39
In the second panel of Table 1.9, we look at whether the fiscal (de)stabilization following
the relaxation of the DSP is driven by cities with an historical rather than a cyclical deficit in
the pre-treatment period, by going as back in time as possible with our data.40 Specifically,
we classify as municipalities with “historical deficit” those characterized by deficit in all the
pre-treatment years, or in all the pre-treatment years but one. One important limitation of
this last heterogeneity analysis is that we have limited power for measuring the historical
propensity to accumulate debt as we can only rely on four pre-treatment years.41
Battaglini and Coate (2008) predict that the costs of restricting fiscal rules will be higher
when governments are characterized by cyclical, rather than persistent, deficit. We find that
the cities who increase deficit are not those characterized by cyclical deficit, and, if anything,
those with more persistent deficit are those who accumulate more debt when unconstrained,
although this last result is not statistically significant.42
39Rogoff (1990) argues that electoral incentives might distort fiscal policy because of the distorted incentives
to over-provide public good when it is more salient for voters.
40Note that we performed an additional robustness check for the five heterogeneity dimensions that we
study in this section. Specifically, we checked whether these variables are balanced at the 5,000 threshold. This
is indeed what we find, suggesting that our strategy of splitting the sample is keeping the sample balanced in
the neighborhood of 5,000 inhabitants as well (results available upon request).
41We were able to construct an internally consistent sample of administrative data from the Italian Ministry
of the Interior only starting from 1997.
42As a final robustness check on our heterogeneity analysis, we repeat the falsification test in 1999 for all
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Table 1.9: Fiscal restraints and budget management
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
Speed of public good provision above median:
Deficit -0.851 7.946 4.433 3.717
(11.291) (7.880) (11.602) (16.051)
Obs. 1,022 1,492 3,153 3,153
Speed of public good provision below median:
Deficit 35.082*** 29.395*** 38.184** 47.452**
(11.995) (9.498) (14.811) (20.275)
Obs. 1,058 1,576 3,147 3,147
Difference between
the two subsamples 35.932 21.449 33.751 43.735
Wald test p-value
without covariates 0.025 0.075 0.065 0.086
Wald test p-value
with covariates 0.029 0.109 0.063 0.057
Historical deficit:
Deficit 25.023*** 19.831*** 26.365*** 26.192***
(6.599) (6.300) (7.913) (9.260)
Obs. 1,536 2,256 4,648 4,648
No historical deficit:
Deficit 6.481 4.279 10.843 10.197
(17.967) (13.156) (20.978) (30.104)
Obs. 912 1,332 2,712 2,712
Difference between
the two subsamples 18.542 15.552 15.522 15.995
Wald test p-value
without covariates 0.332 0.286 0.488 0.611
Wald test p-value
with covariates 0.264 0.342 0.557 0.453
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; between 1999 and 2004. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact
of relaxing fiscal rules on fiscal discipline below 5,000 after 2001 in different subsamples (that is, above vs. below
median speed of public good provision; historical vs. no historical deficit). Municipalities with historical deficit are
those characterized by deficit in all the pre-treatment years since 1997, or in all the pre-treatment years but one.
Estimation methods: Local Linear Regression (LLR) with bandwidth h = 500 or h = 750, as in equation (1.5); spline
polynomial approximation with 3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial, as in equation (1.6). The Wald test p-value without
covariates evaluates whether the estimates are statistically different in the two subsamples. The Wald test p-value with
covariates evaluates whether the estimates are statistically different in the two subsamples also controlling for a full set
of interactions between the above specifications and appropriate covariates, such as: average taxable income; mayor’s
years of schooling; and whether the municipality is in the North. All variables are per capita and in 2009 Euros. Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
the above dimensions but historical deficit (which is constructed using data on the pre-treatment period and
thus cannot be used in that context). Specifically, in the Appendix Tables A5, A6, and A7 we implement the
above heterogeneity diff-in-disc estimations in the interval 1997–2000, using 1999–2000 as the post-treatment
period and 1997–1998 as the pre-treatment period. The fact that no effect and no difference are ever statistically
significant means that municipalities around the threshold in different heterogeneity subsamples are not on
differential trends before 2001. In other words, the DSP did not bind differently across those subsamples.
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On the whole, the results discussed in this section suggest that fiscal restraints are more
likely to bind for cities characterized by political failures, and that political economy factors
play a first-order role in the process of fiscal adjustment.
1.7 Conclusion
Limiting the increase of public debt is a key policy issue in most economies. Fiscal rules are
usually considered one of the potential solutions to public debt growth. In this paper we
rely on a novel quasi-experimental design to show that fiscal rules enforced by a national
government can be effective in causing a reduction of the accumulation of debt by local
governments. Additionally, we are able to investigate the composition of fiscal adjustment
and we show that unconstrained cities have lower tax rates and lower revenues following
the policy change. We then link our results to existing theories of fiscal adjustment to
provide new evidence about the costs and benefits of restraining fiscal policy. We show that
deficit bias arises only where many parties seat in the city council, where mayors can run for
reelection, where there is a smaller fraction of young citizens, where mayors systematically
underprovide the promised public good, and in cities characterized by historical deficit.
These results suggest that fiscal restraints can be more effective when political distortions
are larger.
We are aware that the enhanced internal validity of our evaluation design comes at the
price of lower external validity, as it is always the case in (local) econometric strategies
based on policy discontinuities. However, our falsification test shows that mayors who are
selected through a different mechanism (that is, a different salary) react in the same way
to the introduction of fiscal rules. This suggests that our results can potentially apply to
different institutional settings.
Our results raise a number of questions for further research. First, we show that fiscal
rules, when accompanied by a proper enforcement mechanism, can be effective also in
regulatory environments characterized by serious commitment issues such as the Italian
case. Hence, fiscal rules might be useful in far more cases than those suggested by the
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conventional wisdom, and the optimal design of fiscal rules should take into account
political incentives in the enforcement of the rules. Second, our results on the composition
of fiscal adjustment suggest that stabilizing fiscal policy through revenues rather than
expenditures might not be politically equivalent. A rapidly growing literature in public
economics have shown how the salience of tax changes affects behavioral responses (see
Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009). It is an exciting direction for future research to investigate
whether public good provision is subject to similar issues, and whether policy makers can
exploit voters’ behavioral biases in their favor.43
Our last set of empirical results implies that political incentives drive local government
responses to exogenously imposed fiscal restraints. Since restricting tax smoothing is the
main welfare cost of fiscal restraints identified by the macroeconomic literature, and since
mechanisms for smoothing business cycle fluctuations, such as unemployment insurance,
are often administered at the national level (as suggested by Gavin and Perotti, 1997), our
results suggest that fiscal rules imposed on subnational governments might have limited
welfare costs and significant benefits.
43A first attempt along these lines is Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2011).
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Chapter 2
Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral
Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion
Program1
2.1 Introduction
Government ability to enforce tax collection efficiently is one of the fundamental components
of state capacity and, in turn, an important driver of historical economic development. Tax
evasion generates both large losses in government revenues and large distortions.2 The
literature (e.g., Slemrod (2007); Besley and Persson (2012)) describes three main determinants
of tax compliance: enforcement technology, political incentives, and cultural norms. This
paper illustrates the interaction among these three factors. We estimate the electoral returns
— the change in reelection likelihood— that local policymakers obtain from a nationwide anti
tax evasion policy in Italy, based on an innovation in tax-payers monitoring technology. In
1Co-authored with Lorenzo Casaburi.
2Slemrod (2007) estimates overall noncompliance in the United States at 14 percent. Estimates from other
developed countries deliver similar figures (for Italy, Marino and Zizza (2008)). In developing countries, where
the share of the informal economy is typically larger, the figures are much higher (Gordon and Li (2009);
Schneider, Buehn, and Enste (2010)).
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addition, we study how these electoral returns depend on underlying social preferences for
tax compliance and on the local government efficiency in public good provision. The paper
provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical evidence on voters’ responses to
anti tax evasion policies.
Measures to reduce tax evasion generate a conflict between voters. They hurt tax evaders,
typically a minority of voters, while the majority of the population is likely to benefit from
additional government expenditures, lower tax rates, or even directly from the punishment
of former shirkers.3 However, the magnitude of the individual costs tax evaders incur is
potentially higher than the individual benefits non evaders derive. Anti tax evasion policies
are thus canonical examples of policies that have an asymmetry in the concentration of costs
and benefits (Tullock (1959); Olson (1965)). Depending on which of the two types of voters
is more likely to change its voting behavior in response to changes in enforcement, fighting
tax evasion might either benefit or harm politicians who seek reelection. The sign of this
impact is ex ante ambiguous and, therefore, an empirical question.
In 2007, the Italian government instituted a nationwide anti tax evasion policy, the Ghost
Buildings program. The program identified ghost buildings — properties not included in
the land registry and thus hidden from tax authorities4 — by overlaying aerial photographs
and digital land registry maps.5 The intervention detected more than two million land
registry parcels with ghost buildings.6 Following the completion of the mapping exercise,
the government commenced a large registration program that targeted the identified ghost
buildings. While the central government began the program and coordinated registration
activities, municipality administrations circulated information about the program, collab-
3For experimental evidence on this channel, see Carpenter et al. (2009); Casari and Luini (2009); Ouss and
Peysakhovich (2012).
4The value of registered buildings enters the tax base for personal income tax and property taxes, among
other taxes.
5Other countries, such as Greece and Rwanda, have recently implemented policies using similar technologies.
6The unit of the Italian land registry maps is the parcel (parcella), which is defined as a portion of land
belonging to a given physical or legal person. In the case where the land is shared across several owners, the
parcel is split into several sub-parcels (subalterni).
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orated with follow-up inspections, and enforced payment of overdue local taxes. Media
reports highlight both the importance of local administrations in the registration process7
and the heterogeneity in their actions in response to the program.8
The policy induced a large shift in tax enforcement, the intensity of which varied
significantly across towns. In towns with a higher prevalence of detected ghost buildings,
the program had larger scope to affect the level of building registration. We use a measure
of Ghost Building Intensity — the ratio of the number of land registry parcels with ghost
buildings identified by the program to the total number of land registry parcels in the
town — to proxy for the scope of the program. Using a difference-in-differences approach,
we test the impact of the anti evasion policy on local incumbent reelection by exploiting
variations across municipalities in this intensity.9 This strategy, under plausible assumptions,
isolates the causal effect on electoral outcomes of the policy scope to increase enforcement
from other mayor or voter characteristics that might have affected the actual levels of ghost
building registration in the town.10
In local elections occurring after the beginning of the program, an increase of one
standard deviation in the ghost building intensity raises the likelihood of reelection of the
local incumbent relative to pre-program elections by approximately 2.5 percentage points,
about 5.5% of the average reelection rate. Higher town-level ghost building intensity also
lowers several measures of competitiveness of local elections. In particular, it reduces the
number of candidates running for election, increases the margin of victory for the winner,
and reduces the likelihood of a runoff. Guiding our empirical models is a retrospective
voting framework of political agency. Such a theoretical framework helps us predict how a
change in tax enforcement can impact voter choices and which factors affect this response.
7For example, Dell’Oste and Trovati (2011).
8Among many others, Bernardini (2011) and Barca (2008) discuss the particular way in which the city of
Montecatini and some cities in the Reggio Emilia province implemented the program, respectively.
9In a recent contribution, Mian and Sufi (2012) adopted a similar empirical approach to study the effects of
the fiscal stimulus in the US.
10We verify that the assumptions required by the identification strategy hold (i.e., no contemporary differential
changes and no differential pre-trends in the outcome variable by treatment intensity).
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Additional analysis of the actual building registrations induced by the program comple-
ments the reduced form analysis described above. For a given town-level program scope,
a higher registration rate of ghost buildings under the incumbent local administration
(i.e., the share of ghost buildings that gets registered prior to the local election date) has a
positive effect on the likelihood of reelection. The result is robust to the inclusion of mayors’
characteristics as controls and to an instrumental variable approach, based on the time
elapsed between the program start date and the town election date.
We provide evidence for two channels that could drive the observed electoral response.
First, towns where the government is more efficient in delivering public goods show a larger
electoral response to the program. We also verify that towns with higher ghost building
intensity experienced a differential increase in local government expenditures following
the program inception. Second, using survey data on the self-reported tolerance for tax
evasion among voters, we show that the program’s positive impact on incumbent reelection
is significantly higher in areas with lower tolerance for tax evasion. Finally, the empirical
findings are inconsistent with two potential alternative interpretations on the impact of the
program on voter support for incumbents. In the first, the program changes voter behavior
by providing information on the existing stock of ghost buildings. In the second, it gives
an electoral rent to the incumbent by giving her the option to not register identified ghost
buildings.
Our approach can potentially be applied in different settings to study the political
feasibility of upgrading tax administrations around the world using new electronic data,
cross-checking technologies, and other monitoring devices (Bird and Zolt (2008)). Addi-
tionally, our analysis points at complementarity between technological innovations in tax
enforcement and political incentives. When exposed to a reduction in monitoring costs,
politicians exploit the new technologies and experience political gains. These findings have
a direct bearing on the political feasibility of upgrading tax administrations around the
world using new electronic data, cross-checking technologies, and other monitoring devices
(Bird and Zolt (2008)). In addition, our study provides evidence that the underlying tax
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culture shapes the political incentives for tax enforcement and the political returns to these
innovations (Torgler (2007); Rothstein (2000)). We discuss several policy implications arising
from these findings. Finally, access to town-level nationwide administrative data from
the program allows us to provide evidence on two additional fronts. First, we study the
correlates of tax evasion at the town level. We find that geographical features, such as town
size, are important determinants of tax evasion, consistent with Saiz (2010), and that social
capital is negatively correlated with tax evasion (Putnam (2001)). Second, we document that
mayor characteristics, such as education, gender, and age, do affect the extent to which the
Ghost Buildings program increased tax enforcement (consistent with Alesina (1988); Besley
and Coate (1997); Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2012)).
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, a recent set of studies uses
microdata to shed light on enforcement technologies such as third-party reporting (Slemrod,
Blumenthal, and Christian (2001); Saez (2010); Kleven et al (2011); Chetty, Friedman,
and Saez (2012)), paper trails (Pomeranz (2012); Kumler, Verhoogen, and Frías (2011)),
cross-checking (Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2012)), and targeted auditing strategies
(Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2012); Aparicio (2012)).11 By studying how technology-
driven enforcement policies affect policymakers, we bridge this work with the one estimating
the political returns to fiscal policies (Brender and Drazen (2008); Alesina, Carloni, and
Lecce (2011)). In addition, by delving into the relation between incentives of political agents
and tax evasion, our paper is related to Artavanis, Morse, and Tsoutsoura (2012), who find
that tax evasion is higher in industries supported by parliamentarians. Finally, our results
provide support to the existing literature that highlights the role of culture and social norms
as determinants of tax evasion, either via cross-country analysis (Torgler (2003); Slemrod
(2003)) or lab experiments (Spicer and Becker (1980); Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as it follows. Section 2.2 describes the Ghost
Buildings program. Section 2.3 presents a simple framework that guides our empirical
analysis. Section 2.4 describes the data and presents descriptive evidence. Section 2.5
11For a review of the literature, see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhakil (2002).
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lays out our empirical strategy to estimate the electoral response to the policy. Section 2.6
presents the results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The Ghost Buildings Program
The value of the buildings registered in the land registry enters the tax base for several
national and local taxes, including “ICI", the local property tax, “IRPEF", the personal
income tax,12 and the local waste management tax. Italian legislation13 requires that owners
register new buildings at the local office of the Agenzia del Territorio, the agency managing
the land registry, within thirty days after their completion.14
In 2006, the national government approved new anti tax evasion legislation, the Ghost
Buildings program,15 aimed at detecting buildings not registered in the land registry maps.16
The Agenzia del Territorio, the national agency managing the land registry, coordinated the
effort. The Agenzia del Territorio first juxtaposed the land and building registry maps to
obtain the “Official Building Map". It subsequently compiled high-resolution (50cm) aerial
photographs of the entire country in order to identify the ghost buildings. Figures 1a-1c
summarize the steps of the identification. First, the aerial photograph for a particular
location was created (Figure 1a). Second, the pictures were matched with the official
building map for the corresponding area (Figure 1b). Finally, the ghost buildings were
identified (Figure 1c)17. Ghost buildings include commercial, industrial, and residential
12“IRPEF” includes the inferred opportunity cost of living in the house, with both a local and a national
component.
13Legge 9 Marzo 2006 n.80 - Art. 34-quinquies.
14All buildings in Italy need a building permit before their construction starts. Obtaining a building
permit makes the building part of the City Plan. The process of obtaining building permits is administered
independently from the registration in the land registry maps. Buildings not in the City Plan are required to be
demolished.
15Legge 24 novembre 2006, n. 286 subsequently modified by Legge 30 Luglio 2010, n. 122.
16The exercise did not cover one of the semi-autonomous regions, Trentino Alto-Adige, because in that
region land registry maps are autonomously administered. The region contains less than two percent of the
total population of Italy.
17According to the Law Decreto Ministero delle Finanze 2 gennaio 1998, n.28.Art. 3 the following buildings do
44
stand-alone buildings, and also substantial extensions of previously registered buildings
that should have been reported to the land registry.
Through this process, the Agenzia del Territorio identified approximately two million
land registry parcels with unregistered buildings. Beginning in August 2007, the Agenzia
del Territorio started to publish parcel-level data on unregistered properties in the Gazzetta
Ufficiale, the official bulletin promulgating Italian laws and decrees, in order to induce
registrations of the ghost buildings. Within three years, it coded detailed information on the
number of ghost buildings in the universe of Italian municipalities (with the exception of
Trentino Alto-Adige). The order of publication relied on the availability of digitized land
registry maps at the time when the program started. The Agenzia del Territorio had 60% of
the land registry maps of the Italian territory in digitized form before the Ghost Buildings
program was approved. After 2006, the Agenzia del Territorio began digitizing the remaining
land registry maps, proceeding by province (i.e., they simultaneously coded municipalities
in the same province). It completed the identification exercise by the end of 2010.18
According to the initial legislation, owners could register the detected ghost building with
the land registry by April 30, 2011.19 Widespread media campaigns and local administration
efforts helped the program achieve high registration rates. In particular, local administrators
a) disseminated information about targeted parcels; b) collaborated on follow-up building
inspections; c) proceeded with the collection of overdue local taxes up to five years before
the program began; and d) verified the conformity of ghost buildings to the city plan and
local zoning restrictions. Local administrations received a large share of the additional
tax revenues generated by the program. Owners of ghost buildings that registered prior
to the April 2011 deadline were required to pay overdue taxes dating back to 2007, or to
not increase the tax base of their owners and thus are not subject to registration requirements: (i) buildings that
are not completed (ii) buildings particularly degraded (iii) solar collectors (iv) greenhouses (v) henhouses or
others reserved for animals.
18Publication on the Gazzetta Ufficiale occurred in the following waves: August 2007, October 2007, December
2007, December 2008, December 2009, December 2010.
19This was the result of two previous deadlines of ninety days and seven months since the publication on
the Gazzetta Ufficiale.
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the construction date for post-2007 cases, and to pay penalties for delayed payments.20
After April 2011, the Agenzia del Territorio, with the support of local administrations and
local contractors, proceeded with follow-up inspections21 to impute the tax base for the
remaining unregistered buildings.22 Additional penalties and a fee for the extra inspection
were assessed on owners of buildings for which the Agenzia del Territorio imputed the tax
base after April 2011.
The Agenzia del Territorio published the detailed economic impact of the program for
the year 2011. The program led to a substantial wave of registrations. According to the
administrative data, roughly 40 percent of the ghost buildings were registered as of 30th of
December 2011. According to the figures provided, the program increased total tax revenues
by 472 million euros in that year.23 We estimate that approximately 65 percent of those
revenues come from local taxes. We run a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation using figures
on the number of land parcels with ghost buildings, the registration rates, and the total
additional tax revenues from the program. A one standard deviation increase in ghost
buildings targeted by the program increased the tax revenues by around 3.5% of the median
value. Using the same information, we find that, on average, the owner of a registered ghost
building now faces an additional yearly tax burden of approximately 528 Euros.
2.3 Tax Enforcement and Retrospective Voting: A Conceptual Frame-
work
This section outlines the impact of a change in tax enforcement on voters’ electoral choices.
We provide a simple framework based on modeling of retrospective voting (Barro (1973);
20Penalties were determined by Legge 29 Dicembre 1990, n. 408, subsequently modified by Decreto Legislativo.
18 Dicembre 1997.
21To increase incentives for the local administrations further, an additional bonus was introduced in 2011 for
each registered ghost building.
22Decreto Legge 79/2010, art. 10, 11.
23This figure does not include payment for overdue taxes from previous years.
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Ferejohn (1986)) and of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo (1972)). The main intuition of
retrospective voting models is that citizens examine whether their welfare has increased
under a politician’s office, and vote accordingly.24 While the specific application to tax
evasion is novel, the discussion in this section heavily relies on the intuition from existing
models.
The economy is populated by a unit mass of voters and by politicians. Voters are
heterogeneous in their ability to evade. This ability could be a function of occupation type
(employed vs. self-dependent) or evasion costs (economic and psychological). We consider
a simple case with two fixed types of voters: evaders and non evaders. Evaders pay taxes
only if enforcement occurs, while non-evaders always pay taxes.25 The population share
of evaders is l. Enforcement of tax collection for each evader occurs with probability p.
Enforcement draws are independent across evaders, and thus p is the share of evaders for
which enforcement occurs. This is assumed to be a function of the politician type (a) and of
an idiosyncratic component (u), whose distributions are G(a) and G(u), respectively. Voters
do not observe the two components and are uncertain over the politician type (Banks and
Sundaram (1998)). They use previous realizations to form expectations aˆ and pˆ (in the spirit
of Holmstrom, 1982).
We assume an exogenous income level (normalized to 1) and tax rate (t), constant
across the population. Voters derive utility from disposable income and from the overall
level of enforcement, for instance through increased public good provision and deficit
reduction. This implies that enforcement has two effects on evaders’ utility, which go
in opposite directions. First, enforcement decreases the disposable income for evaders.
However, cracking down on tax evasion increases the size of government, which benefits all
24This implies that incumbent’s reelection is the main outcome to analyze when testing the empirical
predictions of retrospective voting models. Retrospective voting models have received considerable empirical
support in the context of government corruption or fiscal stabilization (Brender, 2003; Besley and Pratt, 2006;
Ferraz and Finan, 2008, Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini and Troiano, 2012).
25For simplicity, we ignore the extra fines evaders pay when audited and, thus, the optimal individual
evasion level they choose.
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citizens, including evaders. The expected utility for evaders, VE is defined as:
VE( pˆ) = pˆ(U(1  t)) + (1  pˆ)U(1) + pˆWE(l, e), (2.1)
where we highlight that VE depends on the expected level of enforcement, pˆ. In Equation
2.1, U(·) is the monetary utility from disposable income and WE(·) is the utility from tax
collection enforcement.26 WE is increasing in l, the share of evaders in the population, and
e, the government efficiency in using tax revenues to produce public good.
We allow non-evaders to obtain an additional non-monetary benefit from enforcement.
One example is the case where, because of fairness concerns, non-evaders derive direct
utility from the enforcement of evaders’ tax payments, independently from their monetary
returns. Thus, the expected utility function for the non-evaders is:
VN( pˆ) = pˆWN(l, e, n) +U(1  t) (2.2)
We notice that, in addition to l and e, VN also depends on n, a shifter that affects the
non-monetary benefits from increases in enforcement. For instance, n captures the extent to
which voters are averse to tax evasion (“tax culture”). In the model, we abstract from the
utility arising from government services financed by the tax payments of the non-evaders
since that does not depend on pˆ, the core variable of interest for our argument.
We now consider the voters’ choice between an incumbent and a contender. We adopt a
standard probabilistic voting approach (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). In the text below, aˆ
and pˆ denote the voters’ beliefs about incumbent type and enforcement, respectively. On
the other hand a and p capture the expectations about the contender. In deciding whether
to reelected the incumbent, the two groups of voters compare the utility under the expected
incumbent’s type with an average opponent. Voter i in group j = {E,N} will reelect the
incumbent if Vj( pˆ) > Vj(p) + eij + d. The parameter eij is an individual ideological bias
26In order to simplify the presentation, we assume that the utility from enforcement is proportional to the
expected level of enforcement.
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toward the contender, distributed uniformly over [  12fj , 12fj ].27 The parameter d measures
the average popularity of the contender in the population and is distributed uniformly over
U[  12 , 12 ].
Under the above assumptions, the ex-ante incumbent reelection probability (i.e., before
the realization of d) is:
p = ( pˆ  p) [lfE( U(1) +U(1  t) +WE) + (1  l)fNWN ] (2.3)
The following equation presents the electoral impact of an increase in the expected




  U(1) +U(1  t) +WE + (1  l)fNWN (2.4)
The first term of the outer sum represents the net electoral gains coming from evaders
voting. These will be negative whenever the utility cost of the expected loss in disposable
income, U(1) U(1  t), more than offsets the benefits from enforcement, WE. The second
term is the electoral gain from non-evaders (always positive). This duality is consistent with
the discussion in Section 2.1: an increase in the perception of the enforcement type of the
incumbent has ambiguous effects. The change generates a conflict across voters and the
model parameters determine which channel prevails.
In addition, the model delivers intuitive comparative statics on the heterogeneity of the
electoral impact arising from an increase in expected enforcement under the incumbent.
Intuitively, both governmental efficiency in public good provision and the intensity of










= (1  l)fN ∂WN∂n , (2.6)
27The parameters fE and fN should be interpreted as proxies for the responsiveness of voters in each group
to tax evasion enforcement. They might reflect for example the fact that the political power of a group can
change depending on its size or ability to self-organize (Olson(1965)).
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which are both positive.
To summarize, the simple model predicts that an increase in the expected level of
enforcement under the incumbent:
i) Has an ambiguous impact on the incumbent reelection likelihood
ii) Is larger when government is more efficient in public good provision
iii) Is larger when the non-monetary returns from enforcement are larger
The Ghost Buildings program allows us to shed light on these predictions. The, program
initiated by the central government, can be considered as a positive shock to enforcement.
We argue that voters observe the increase in the building registration but have limited
information about the specific “production function" of enforcement (i.e., information
collected by the central government, local administration effort, and complementarity
between the two sources) This in turn increases the belief voters hold about the local
incumbent type, aˆ (and thus on pˆ), and, according to the model, generates an ambiguous
effect on the incumbent reelection probability.
Crucially, this result relies on the assumption that voters have limited information about
the details of the Ghost Buildings program. They observe the change in enforcement and
still attribute a part of it to the incumbent, thus extracting signal on her type. Models with
rational but poorly informed voters have received growing attention in the literature. They
can provide theoretical support for the empirical findings that voters’ electoral choices
respond to economic conditions (Wolfers (2009)), natural disasters (Cole, Healy, and Werker
(2012)), corruption (Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini and Troiano, (2012)) and quasi-random
targeted transfers (Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2011)). In addition, a recent wave of
randomized experiments shows that information provision can significantly affect voter
choices and political outcomes (for a review, see Pande (2011)). For the Ghost Buildings
program, it is likely that inference about who exactly was causing the extra enforcement
was difficult. Local administration efforts complemented the initial identification process.
In addition, evidence from media reports and town bulletins suggest that at least some
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mayors claimed a role throughout the program, including the initial stages of building
identification through aerial pictures (Cavallaro (2011), Corriere della Citta’ (2012), Gazzetta
del Mezzogiorno (2012)).
Finally, we notice that it is also possible to predict an impact on support for the incumbent
in an alternative model where voters perfectly observe the nature of the Ghost Buildings
program (while they are still uncertain about the type of mayor). In this alternative setting,
the program provides an opportunity for voters to extract a more precise signal about the
incumbent type, as in Bubb (2008). This can in turn either benefit or hurt the incumbent,
depending for instance on voter risk preferences (Quattrone and Tversky (1988)) or on the
skewness of the distribution of incumbent types (Caselli et al, (2013)). In the rest of the
paper, we do not aim to differentiate the two classes of models in the data analysis. Rather,
the insight that the net voter response to an enforcement policy is theoretically ambiguous,
which is common to both models, motivates our empirical investigation.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
2.4.1 Data
The main database for the analysis includes information on the number of parcels containing
Ghost Buildings in each town. The aerial photographs detected more than two million such
parcels. We target the population of 7,720 of the 8,092 Italian towns (Comuni) for which
we can define the measure of ghost building intensity. Additionally, we obtain data on
registered ghost buildings up to the deadline of April 30, 2011. In order to analyze the
electoral response to ghost building registration, we construct a measure of registration
imputable to the incumbent administration. Specifically, we multiply the registration rate by
the ratio between a) the time elapsed between program start date and election date and b)
the time elapsed between program start date and April 2011.28
28In one of our robustness checks, we also compute a second measure of registration imputable to the
incumbent under the assumption of a constant growth rate of 50% in the registration levels over years.
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We complement this information with data from the Italian Deparment of the Interior
(Ministero degli Interni) which contains outcomes for the universe of municipal elections
from 1993 to 2011.29 In Figure 2.2, we plot the number of elections per year. Towns vote
in different years, according to predetermined waves. We distinguish between elections
before and after the beginning of the Ghost Buildings program. There are almost 5,200
municipalities for which we have data on an election that occurred after program inception
(about 67% of the total number of towns targeted by the program). It is also important to
discuss two institutional reforms that occurred in the time span of our sample. First, in 1993,
the starting year for our election sample, Italian municipal politics were overhauled: a new
electoral law changed the mayoral electoral system from party to individual ballot. It also
introduced a two-term limit. Second, in 2000, the length of the mayoral term was extended
from four to five years.
In addition to the core data, we collect geographic and socio-economic data at the
municipality level from the Italian National Statistical Office. Finally, we use two additional
data sources to test the channels driving the electoral response: town-level government
expenses (from the Ministero degli Interni) and a region-level standardized score to the
question “Do you justify tax cheating?” from the European Values Study.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the paper. Panel A
presents the main variables related to the Ghost Buildings program. Panels B and C include
town-level geographical and socio-economic covariates, respectively. These are measured
prior to the inception of the Ghost Buildings program, mostly in the 2001 Population Census.
Panel D (“Mayor” variables”) summarizes characteristics of the mayor in office at the time
of the program inception in the town.30 for each Italian city in our sample. In Panel E,
we summarize the local election panel variables.31 Tables B.1 and B.2 provide a detailed
29The Italian municipal government (Comune) is composed of a mayor (Sindaco), an executive committee
(Giunta) appointed by the mayor, and an elected city council (Consiglio Comunale).
30Only about a half of mayors are matched to national parties. We therefore choose not to focus on this
variable in our analysis. Including dummies for political alignment among the controls in the regressions does
not affect the results we present later in the paper.
31Given that our main outcome of interest is the probability of reelection, Table 2.1 summarizes the variables
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Pre−Program Election Post−Program Election
Notes: The figure shows, for each calendar year, the number of elections held before and after the inception of
the Ghost Buildings program. The figure includes elections from 1993 to 2011.
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description of data sources and variable definitions.
2.4.2 The Correlates of Tax Evasion
We use data from the Ghost Buildings program to study the correlates of tax evasion at
the town level. Figure 2.3 presents our measure of ghost building intensity across Italian
towns.32 Tax evasion is more prevalent in Southern Italy, and it is less widespread in the
North. Table 2.2 presents the correlates of ghost building intensity (per 1,000 of land registry
parcels). In Column (1), we first study whether geographical factors (altitude, area size
of the municipality, number of land registry parcels) are correlated with tax evasion. In
Column (2), we add socio-economic controls (population, income per-capita, social capital,
number of firms, urbanization rate). Finally, in Column (3), we show that our results are
unaffected by the inclusion of regional fixed effects.33
We find that several geographic characteristics are strongly associated with tax evasion.
In particular, controlling for other variables, tax evasion is higher in more widespread
municipalities. Plausibly, in cities with wide geographical extension, the opportunities for
unregistered buildings are higher as the enforcement of building registration is more difficult
and resource-intensive. However, we cannot decisively interpret this evidence as causal.
Previous literature has shown for example that borders are endogenously determined (see,
among others, Alesina and Spolaore (1997); Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004); Alesina,
Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011)).
Finally, as expected, tax evasion is negatively associated with both social capital and
income. In particular, the finding on social capital is consistent with Putnam (2001), who
finds that the percentage of tax evasion, as measured by the Internal Revenue Service,
only for the elections in which the mayor does not face a binding a term limit.
32For presentation purposes, we choose to show the results of this section using a measure of ghost building
intensity obtained by normalizing the number of parcels with ghost buildings (per 1,000 land registry parcels).
33For 3.5% of the towns in our sample we are missing at least one town-level control. In our regressions
throughout the paper, for each control, we include a binary indicator which is equal to one if the control is
missing. In addition, we replace missing values with an arbitrary unique value. The results of our paper are


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.3: Ghost Building Intensity (per 1,000 land registry parcels)
0 187
Notes: In this figure, Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the number of land registry parcels with ghost
buildings per thousand of land registry parcels. White areas identify towns for which we do not have data.
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Table 2.2: The Determinants of Ghost Building Intensity (per 1,000 land parcels)
(1) (2) (3)
Town Area Size (sq km) 0.102⇤⇤⇤ 0.123⇤⇤⇤ 0.098⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.015) (0.012)
Altitude (mt) -0.015⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤ -0.011⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Land Registry Parcels (1,000) -0.236⇤⇤⇤ -0.328⇤⇤⇤ -0.270⇤⇤⇤
(0.065) (0.070) (0.047)
Population (1,000) 0.020 0.004
(0.016) (0.011)
Disposable Income per capita (1,000 Euros) -2.601⇤⇤⇤ -1.223⇤⇤⇤
(0.363) (0.291)
Urbanization Index 5.948⇤⇤⇤ 4.407⇤⇤⇤
(1.839) (1.652)
Non-Profit Associations/1,000 pop -0.458⇤⇤⇤ -0.211⇤⇤⇤
(0.144) (0.074)
Number of Firms per capita 56.100⇤⇤⇤ 89.945⇤⇤⇤
(20.040) (17.842)
Region FE X
Observations 7720 7720 7720
Notes: The dependent variable is the town-level ghost building intensity per thousand of parcels, defined
as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of
land registry parcels, multiplied by one thousand. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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is strongly related to differences in social capital at the state level. Additionally, when
analyzing the DDB Chicago Lifestyles survey, he argues that by far the best predictor of
tax evasion is the number of times in the course of the last year that respondents gave the
“finger” to another driver.
2.4.3 The Political Determinants of the Ghost Buildings Registration
We now provide more details on the wave of registration of ghost buildings induced by
the program. First, we show that the number of ghost buildings detected by the program
is a good predictor of the number of ghost buildings that were registered in response
to the policy. Figure 2.4 displays the relation between the number of land parcels with
ghost buildings eventually registered by the April 2011 deadline (“registered ghost building
intensity”) and the number of parcels that were identified as containing ghost buildings
(“ghost building intensity”), both as a share of the total number of land registry parcels. In
the graph, the x-axis variable is partitioned into 25 quantiles. The scatter plot shows a clear
increasing relation. In a linear regression analysis, an increase of one standard deviation
in the detected intensity of ghost buildings raises the registered ghost building intensity
at April 2011 by approximately 0.75 standard deviations (p < 0.01).34 To summarize, the
program scope at the town-level strongly predicts the actual impact of the program on
tax enforcement. This premise motivates the strategy that we introduce in Section 2.5 to
estimate the impact of the Ghost Buildings program on electoral outcomes.
Second, we analyze the ghost buildings registration rate, defined as the percentage of
ghost building parcels that get registered by the April 2011 deadline. Figure 2.5 summarizes
the ghost building registration rate and documents a substantial dispersion across towns.
Table 2.3 documents the impact of characteristics of the mayor at the time of the program
inception on this outcome. For a given level of the other covariates, the registration rate is
higher when mayors are male, younger, more educated, or are born in the same city in which
34The relation is basically unchanged when adding town-level controls and regional fixed effects (results
available on request).
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Ghost Building Intensity
Notes: The scatter plots the relation between Registered Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the fraction of land parcels
with ghost buildings that get registered by April 2011) and Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the fraction of land
parcels with ghost buildings identified by the program). The x-axis is partitioned into 25 quantiles. The x-axis
of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in the quantile. The y-axis is the average value of
the registered ghost building intensity in the quantile. We cut the top 1% of the x-axis values from the graph.
The line plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
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they serve as mayor. The correlation between gender and policies in Italian municipality
is potentially consistent with the results of Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012), who find
that female policymakers usually face more difficulty in implementing policies when in
office. To the extent education can be considered a proxy for politicians’ quality (see, for
example, Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011)), this set of results also supports the
view that better policymakers fight tax evasion more. We highlight the correlation between
the mayor’s place of birth and the tax evasion enforcement. One possible explanation
could be that mayors who are born in the same city have access to additional information
that can facilitate tax evasion enforcement. We acknowledge that this evidence relies on
cross-sectional correlation analysis and thus should be interpreted with caution. However,
we also notice that the results are robust to the inclusion of geographical and socio-economic
controls, in Columns (2) and (3), respectively. With these caveats in mind, the findings
of this section suggest that mayor’s characteristics did have a role in shaping registration
activities across towns.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
2.5.1 The Electoral Response to the Ghost Buildings Program
In this section, we outline our approach to estimate the voter response to the Ghost Buildings
program. We also aim to isolate the channels that drive this response. Our empirical strategy
exploits variation across towns in the program scope to increase tax enforcement.35 We
implement a difference-in-differences approach based on the town-level ghost building
intensity, which we defined above as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels
with ghost buildings and total number of land registry parcels in each town.
In Section 2.4.3, we documented that mayor characteristics, such as age, education, and
35Importantly, the Agenzia del Territorio conducted the detection activities homogeneously throughout the
country. Thus, heterogeneity in the number of detected unregistered buildings captures differences in of actual
levels of non-registration at the time of the aerial photographing as opposed to differential intensity in the
detection activity.
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Ghost Building Registation Rate
Notes: The histogram shows the distribution of the ghost building rate at April 30, 2011, defined as the ratio
between the number of land registry parcels ghost buildings that get registered by April 2011 and the number
of land registry parcels with ghost buildings identified by the program.
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Table 2.3: The Determinants of the Ghost Building Registration Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Mayor Age -0.067⇤⇤⇤ -0.068⇤⇤⇤ -0.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Mayor Education 0.704⇤⇤⇤ 0.630⇤⇤ 0.702⇤⇤⇤
(0.265) (0.262) (0.249)
Mayor Born Same City (0/1) 1.051⇤⇤ 1.145⇤⇤⇤ 0.968⇤⇤
(0.424) (0.423) (0.408)
Mayor Term Number -0.174 -0.047 -0.041
(0.362) (0.353) (0.364)
Mayor Woman (0/1) -0.923 -1.246⇤⇤ -1.202⇤
(0.642) (0.626) (0.607)
Geograpic Controls X X
Socio-Economic Controls X
Observations 7720 7720 7720
Notes: The dependent variable is the town-level ghost building registration rate,
defined as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings
that get registered by April 2011 and the number of land registry parcels with ghost
buildings identified at the beginning of the program. Refer to Table 2.1 for a description
of the Geographic and Socio-Economic Controls. All the regressions include regional
fixed effects and year-of-program-inception fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
gender, predict the registration rate of the detected ghost buildings. In addition, the actual
levels of registration might depend on voter preferences and responsiveness to the program.
Thus, a naive analysis looking at the relationship between actual ghost building registrations
and reelection outcomes will suffer from the standard omitted variable bias. This motivates
our focus on ex ante program scope to increase enforcement.
The rationale for our identification approach is that program scope at the town level
predicts the increase in enforcement induced by the Ghost Buildings program, as shown
in Figure 2.4. Towns with a higher share of parcels with detected ghost buildings also have,
on average, a higher share of parcels with registered ghost buildings, as measured in April
2011.36
36Importantly, we argue that the intensity of ghost buildings is not a valid instrument for actual registration
intensity. In principle, as we discussed in Section 2.1, the program could affect incumbent reelection probability
through other channels besides registration. This would make the standard exclusion restriction required for an
instrumental variable approach invalid.
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Our baseline specification is therefore:
Rimet = b0 + b1Postie · Ghost Building Intensityi + hm · Postie + fi + ft + eimet (2.7)
The dependent variable Riret is a dummy that indicates whether the incumbent of municipal-
ity i in macro-area m is re-elected in election e in year t. Observations where the incumbent
cannot be reelected because of a binding term limit are excluded from the regression sample.
The dummy Post is equal to one when election e occurs after the beginning of the Ghost
Buildings program in the town. The coefficients hm capture post-program period fixed
effects that are specific to the four Italia macro-areas37 m where town i is located. We also
include town fixed effects, fi, and election year fixed effects, ft. Finally, Ghost Building
Intensityi is the intensity of ghost buildings in town i. The coefficient of interest, b1, thus
captures the differential impact of the Ghost Buildings program on incumbent reelection by
ghost building intensity. Throughout the paper, we cluster standard errors at the provincial
level to allow for spatial correlation in the error term.
We adopt a similar regression model to study the impact of the program on other
electoral competitiveness outcomes. We focus on four variables: i) a binary indicator for
whether the incumbent reruns for election; ii) the number of candidates running for the
mayor office; iii) the difference in the percentage of votes between the first and the second
candidate;38 iv) a binary indicator equal to one if a runoff takes place, which occurs in towns
with more than 15,000 inhabitants when none of the candidates obtain the absolute majority
in the first-round.
One potential challenge to our identification strategy may arise from the town-specific
timing of publications of the unauthorized building lists. On the one hand, if local adminis-
trators had influence over publication date, unpopular mayors in cities with high evasion
rates might lobby to delay the publication. On the other hand, the central government
might push to start the program earlier in those towns where mayors set a lower level of
37North, Center, South, Islands.
38For elections with a runoff, we use the first round results.
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tax enforcement. In both these cases, our estimates of the impact of the Ghost Building
program on reelection likelihood might just capture a selection effect. We handle this
concern in several ways. First, as discussed in Section 2.2, we notice that the timing of the
publication was primarily determined at the provincial level by the availability of digital
land registry maps and was highly clustered by province. Figure 2.6 emphasizes the high
level of provincial clustering in the publication years. Only about 7% of the post-program
elections have values for the post-program indicator different from the one they would have
had based on the modal date of publication in the province. To deal with these discrepancies
we implement an instrumental variable approach. We code elections based on whether they
occur before or after the modal date of publication of the unauthorized building lists in
the province. We then instrument the actual Post dummy with this binary indicator at the
provincial level. We adopt this strategy for our main specifications.39 In addition, in Section
2.6.2, we present robustness checks using an alternative instrument for the post-program
indicator using the national modal program inception year.
As is standard in difference-in-differences estimation, identification of the coefficient
of interest relies on two assumptions. The first is the absence of contemporary events that
differentially affected towns having higher ghost building intensity. We are not aware of
other policies targeting this form of tax evasion happening concurrently with the Ghost
Buildings program. However, it is still possible that other events, which differ in intensity
by other variables correlated with ghost building intensity, occurred at the same time. We
address the concern by presenting alternative specifications where we include interactions
between a comprehensive set of geographical, socio-economic, and political controls, all
measured before the beginning of the program, and the post-program binary indicator. The
second assumption is the presence of parallel trends in the outcome variable. We assess this
assumption using several tests and placebo exercises in the next section.
39The towns targeted by the program belonged to 101 provinces.
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Figure 2.6: Ghost Buildings Program Inception Year
Notes: The figure shows the year of inception of the Ghost Building program (i.e., the year of publication of the
list of ghost buildings) in each town. White areas identify towns for which we do not have data.
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2.5.2 Channels
The reduced form approach presented thus far tests whether higher program scope to
increase tax enforcement at the town level affects incumbent reelection likelihood in the
post-program period. We complement this baseline regression with further analysis. First,
we show that it is the registration induced by the program that drives the electoral response,
as opposed to other potential interpretations. For this purpose, we use actual ghost building
registration data. In Section 2.4, we emphasized several important measurement limitations
of these data that warrant caution. With this caveat in mind, we test whether, for a given
intensity of ghost buildings, a higher ghost building registration rate (Registration Rate)
induced by the program has a positive effect on incumbent reelection likelihood:
Rimet = g0 + g1Postie · Ghost Building Intensityi
+ g2Postie · Registration Ratei + zm · Postie + µi + µt + uimet
(2.8)
As we discussed above, an obvious threat to identification of g2 in Equation 2.8 arises
from the fact that the registration effort is potentially correlated with many potential town-
level confounders. We first check robustness of the results to the inclusion of mayor controls.
In addition, the timing of the program provides a strategy that can alleviate this concern.
Even if the program started in the same year in most of the towns, we can exploit the
variation generated by the fact that Italian municipalities hold elections in different years. A
longer time between the beginning of the program and the election date naturally leads to
more registration activities. This generates variation across towns in the registration rate
achieved prior to the local election date that is plausibly uncorrelated with mayor quality.
We use this instrumental variable strategy to look at the impact of a change in registration
rate on incumbent reelection likelihood.
Second, we shed light on the channels through which the program could affect voters’
political preferences. Consistently with the theoretical framework, we investigate the
interaction among the political returns to an increase in tax enforcement, local government
efficiency in delivering public goods, and “tax culture”, the stigma associated to evading
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taxes. We use the speed of public good provision as a proxy for the quality of the delivery at
the municipal level. This indicator is measured as the ratio of paid outlays in the municipal
financial report over the total outlays committed in the budget. The intuition is that the
provision of public goods is more effective in places where the actual allocation delivered to
citizens is closer to the amount allocated in the budget.40 The following regression model
tests whether the electoral response to the Ghost Building program varies by speed of public
good provision:
Riret = d0 + d1Postie · Ghost Building Intensityi + d2Postie · Speed Public Good Provisioni
+ d3 · Postie ⇤ GBi · Speed Public Good Provisioni + xr · Postie + li + lt + niret
(2.9)
where d3 is the coefficient of interest.
We then use data from the European Value Study — the European component of World
Values Survey— to study the role of tax culture. Specifically, we use the question: “Do
you justify cheating on tax?”. For these data, geographical identification of respondents is
available only at the regional level. We thus compute and standardize region-level means.
The regression model to capture heterogeneity by this variable is similar to the one presented
in Equation 2.9.
Finally, we also assess the impact of the program on town-level public expenditures. To
test whether the program scope to increase tax enforcement affected these expenditures,
we adopt a specification similar to the one we presented in Equation 2.7, using the natural
logarithm of the local government expenditures as the dependent variable.
40A similar proxy has been used by Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano (2013) and Gagliarducci and Nannicini
(2013) to measure the quality of public good delivery. For our sample, we compute the speed of public good
provision as the average across two pre-treatment years. The results are similar with alternative definitions.
Results are available upon request.
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Ghost Building Intensity
Notes: The scatter plots the relation between the change in the average (year-demeaned) reelection rate between
the pre-program and the post-program periods and the Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the ratio between the
number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels). The x-axis
is partitioned into 25 quantiles. The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in the
quantile. The y-axis is the average value of the registered ghost building intensity in the quantile. We cut the
top 1% of the x-axis values from the graph. The sample includes elections with no binding term limit. The line
plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Baseline Results
In this section, we investigate the electoral consequences of the Ghost Buildings program.
Figure 2.7 provides a visual analysis of the relation between ghost building intensity and
changes in the incumbent reelection likelihood — our main outcome variable — after the
beginning of the program. On the x-axis, the ghost building intensity is partitioned into
25 quantiles. The scatter displays a clear increasing relation, with the quantile dots fairly
closed aligned along the fitting line.
Table 2.4 formalizes the analysis above and presents the results of the difference-in-
differences estimation discussed in Section 2.5. Column (1) reports the basic OLS spec-
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ification (“Reduced Form”) using the provincial post-program indicator. The coefficient
remains stable with the inclusion of fixed effect (Column (2)) and of election year fixed effect
(Column (3)). Starting in Column (4), we instrument the post-program indicator with the
provincial post-program indicator. The coefficient is stable across the different specifications.
The inclusion of year fixed effects and town fixed effects, in Columns (5) and (6) respectively,
does not change our results. In Column (6) — the baseline specification for the rest of the
analysis — the reported coefficient on the interaction between the ghost building intensity
and the post-program indicator is 1.042, significant at 1%. This magnitude implies that a one
standard deviation in the town-level program scope to increase enforcement, as measured
by the ghost building intensity, raises the likelihood of reelection of the incumbent by
approximately 2.5 percentage points in post-program elections, relative to pre-program ones
(from a sample mean of 45.4). A back of the envelope calculation suggests that the effect of a
one standard deviation increase in Ghost Buildings program scope on incumbent reelection
probability is on the order of magnitude of i) 6% of the incumbency effect in U.S. House
Elections (Lee (2008)) and ii) the effect of a 5% increase in town government spending in
Brazil municipal elections (Litschig and Morrison (2012)).
We adopt an analogous regression strategy to study the impact of the program on other
measures of election competitiveness as described in Section 2.5. For each of these variables,
we report the specification used in Column (6) of Table 2.4. Table 2.5 presents a clear picture.
An increase in ghost building intensity raises the likelihood that the incumbent re-runs, and
decreases competitiveness of the elections. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase
in ghost building intensity reduces the number of candidates by 0.03 standard deviations,
increases the margin of victory by 0.05 standard deviations, though this last result is not
statistically significant at conventional levels, and reduces the likelihood of a runoff by 15%
of the mean value. This is consistent with the idea that potential entrants in the electoral

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6.2 Identification Validity and Robustness Checks
In this section, we report several auxiliary results that support the validity of our iden-
tification strategy. We focus on our main outcome variable: the likelihood of incumbent
reelection.41 Figure 2.8 presents a placebo version of Figure 2.7. We look only at pre-program
elections and define a placebo program year in the median year of this restricted sample.
In this exercise, the relation between changes in incumbent reelection likelihood from the
pre- to the post-program periods appears and ghost building intensity is very noisy and, if
anything, negative.
Second, we test whether the inclusion of town-level controls affects our results. Specifi-
cally, we look at three sets of town-level variables that we present in Table 2.1: geographic
features, socio-economic variables, and incumbent mayor characteristics at the time of
the program commencement. We include the interaction between these variables and the
post-program indicator in our regression model (the level is absorbed by the town fixed
effect). If the findings in Table 2.4 were reflecting differential changes in the outcome along
variables correlated to the ghost building intensity, we would expect the coefficient on the
interaction between ghost building intensity and post-program indicator to be substantially
affected by the inclusion of these extra controls. Table 2.6 presents the results of this analysis.
We find that the baseline results are very robust to the inclusion of each set of controls both
separately (Columns (2)-(4)) and together (Column (5)).
In Figure 2.9, we check whether towns with different levels of evasion were on different
trends before the treatment. We report point estimates and confidence intervals on ghost
building intensity for each of the elections pre- and post-program. The figure shows that,
before the Ghost Buildings program started, the probability of reelection of the incumbent
was independent of tax evasion. None of the pre-program coefficients are either significantly
different from zero (the normalized value of the coefficient in the ‚Äú-1‚Äù election, the
omitted group) or significantly different from each other. However, after the beginning of
the program there is a statistically and economically significant impact. Thus, the coefficient
41We obtain similar results for our auxiliary outcome variables. Results are available on request.
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Ghost Building Intensity
Notes: The scatter plots the relation between the change in the average (year-demeaned) reelection rate between
the pre-program and the post-program periods and the Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the ratio between the
number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels). The x-axis
is partitioned into 25 quantiles. The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in
the quantile. The y-axis is the average value of the registered ghost building intensity in the quantile. We cut
the top 1% of the x-axis values from the graph. The sample includes elections with no binding term limit. The
line plots the predicted values from a linear regression model. The placebo subsample of observations used
for this graph only includes election that occurred before the actual program inception. In each town, the year
of the placebo program start is defined as nine years before the actual publication. This roughly divides the
graph sample in two equally sized groups of pre-placebo and post-placebo elections. The domain of the ghost
building intensity is partitioned in 25 quantiles. The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building
intensity in the quantile. The y-axis is the average value of the registered ghost building intensity in the quantile.
We trim the top 1% of the x-axis values. The sample includes elections with no binding term limit. The line
plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
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Table 2.6: Ghost Building Intensity and Incumbent Reelection: Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.042⇤⇤⇤ 0.850⇤⇤ 1.053⇤⇤ 1.254⇤⇤⇤ 1.096⇤⇤⇤
(0.378) (0.370) (0.410) (0.360) (0.374)
Geographical Controls*Post X X
Socio-Economic Controls*Post X X
Mayor Controls*Post X X
Observations 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected (mean
0.453). Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program
inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the
election occurs after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is defined
as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land
registry parcels. Refer to Table 2.1 for a description of the Geographic, Socio-Economic, andMayor Controls. All
the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year fixed effects and an interaction between macro-areas
fixed effects and Post. The regression sample includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the
incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
pattern in Figure 2.9 suggests that the common trend assumption holds in our setting.42
Table 2.7 presents several additional robustness checks. Column (1) shows our baseline
specification. In Column (2), we show that the results are robust to the inclusion between
regional dummies and post-program indicators. In Column (3), we show that our results
hold if we trim the ghost building intensity at the top 1 percent. If anything, the coefficient
size grows. This suggests that outliers (i.e., cities with an abnormally large fraction of
unregistered buildings) are not driving the results. In Column (4), we check robustness of
the results to dropping small towns with a low number of land registry parcels (we drop
the bottom 10%). One might be concerned that our results are driven by cities with a large
number of non-residents who own a building. If this were the case, mayors would not
pay the electoral cost of enforcing tax evasion. Therefore, we exclude in Column (5) cities
that are classified as tourist destinations by Ancitel, the Italian Association of Cities.43 The
42Appendix Figure B.1 shows that the parallel trend assumptions hold also for the other political outcome
variables described above.
43Ancitel defines as tourist destinations those cities with a large percentage of touristic income over the total
city income. As noted by the Italian Association of Real Estate Agents (FIAIP) in their yearly report cities with
touristic activities are usually those with a large number of buildings not owned by residents.
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4 −3 −2 −1 1
Election Rank Relative to the Ghost Building Program
Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval
Notes: The graph reports the coefficients on the ghost building intensity for each election before and after the
beginning of the Ghost Buildings program. On the x-axis, elections are ranked based on their occurrence relative
to the program. The regression includes town and year fixed effects. For each election rank, we report the point
estimate and the 95% confidence interval. The last election before the program (“-1") is the omitted category.
The coefficient on ghost building intensity for this election is normalized to zero. Confidence interval width for
this election is obtained as the mean of the confidence interval width in election -2 and election +1. The modal
number of years between elections is five years between 1993 and 2001, and four afterwards.
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results are robust to this sample restriction. Column (6) reports an alternative definition of
the post-program indicator. We instrument the town-level indicator with a binary indicator
that takes value one for the years 2007-2011. This approach treats 2007, the first and modal
program start year in the country, as the intended program start year for all the towns. It thus
estimates the Local Average Treatment Effect for those towns that started the program in that
year, which constitutes a different population of compliers relative to the main specification.
The coefficient is about one standard-error larger than our baseline specification and still
significant at 1%. Finally, we report an alternative normalization for our dependent variable.
As the data reported by the Agenzia del Territorio included the number of parcels with
unregistered buildings, we divided this outcome by the total number of land registry parcels
in each municipality in our baseline specification. In order to show that this choice does
not affect the result, in Column (7) we estimate our equation using the total number of
buildings recorded in the town as a normalizing factor, rather than the total number of land
registry parcels. We get very similar results. The effect of one standard deviation in this
alternative variable is comparable in magnitude to the one obtained when using our main
ghost building intensity variable.44
2.6.3 Channels
This section elaborates on some of the potential channels through which the anti tax evasion
program could increase voter support for the incumbent. Table 2.8 presents the results from
the estimation of Equation 2.8. This step aims to show that the increase in tax enforcement
induced by the program — the ghost buildings registration — drove the electoral response.
In Columns (1) and (2), we present the correlation between the registration rate and the
incumbent reelection. We find that, controlling for ghost building intensity, a one standard
deviation increase in ghost building registration rate raises reelection likelihood by 1.3
percentage points. The result holds when using both a) the April 2011 registration rate
with year fixed effects and b) the registration rate reached by the election year computed
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as described in Section 2.4. In Column (3), we show that adding the interaction between
town- and mayor-level controls and the post-program indicator does not change the result.
In Column (4), we show that the motivation for the instrumental variable strategy for the
registration rate finds support in the data: years elapsed since the program start at election
time are a good predictor of the registration rate at that time. In Column (5) we use the
years elapsed since the program start as an instrument for registration rate.45 In the IV
specification, a one standard deviation increase in the registration rate (.079) raises the
reelection likelihood by 4 percentage points in post-program elections. In Column (6) we
show that the IV estimate is unchanged when adding town and mayor controls. Finally,
Column (7) shows that an alternative computation of the registration rate imputable to the
incumbent — assuming a constant growth rate of 50% in the registration levels — delivers
similar results.
In Columns (5) and (7), we notice that the IV estimates are larger than the respective OLS
estimates. This is relatively common (see, for example, the returns to schooling literature,
reviewed in Card (2001)), and it can be explained either by OLS attenuation bias due to
measurement error, or by the fact that in the set of cities affected by the IV — that is, cities
where the registration activity depends on program duration — the political returns to
registration might be bigger than in the rest of the cities (i.e., we are estimating a LATE).
Even if our instrument is uncorrelated with any idiosyncratic city-specific characteristics,
we are not able to rule out the possibility that having the program for longer time has an
independent effect on its impact on the probability of reelection. While we acknowledge
this possibility, we still believe that our instrument does a good job in addressing the main
endogeneity concern for the registration efforts of the mayors (town-specific characteristics,
such as the mayor’s ability or effort).
We then provide empirical support for two channels affecting the electoral response
45In our IV specification we do not control for year fixed effects. Three quarters of the post-program elections
come from cities that started the program in 2007. Thus, we lose statistical significance when running this





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to the program. Our simple theoretical framework predicted that this should be higher
in towns where the local government delivers public goods more effectively and where
the non-monetary returns to tax enforcement are higher. We provide evidence about these
hypotheses by estimating Equation 2.9. The coefficient of interest d3 captures the impact
of a standard-deviation increase in the variables measuring either the municipal speed
of public good provision or the tolerance for tax evasion on the electoral response to the
program. Table 2.9 presents the results. In column (1) we find that a one standard deviation
increase in the speed of public good provision increases the point estimate of the impact of
ghost buildings on reelection by 0.63, and that this coefficient is statistically significant at
the ten percent level. We then confirm that this interaction effect does not simply capture
geographical variation in the responsiveness across different parts of Italy by adding triple
interactions across the post-program indicator, the ghost building intensity, and the macro
area dummies. The sign and economic significance of the coefficient is robust, though
estimated less precisely (p=.137).
We then look at the role of tax culture. We exploit variations across regions in the extent
to which respondents “justify tax cheating” in the European Values Study. These results
provide clear evidence the tax culture matters. In Column (3), we show that a one standard
deviation increase in the tolerance score reduces the point estimate of the impact of ghost
buildings on reelection by .64, (significant at the ten percent level). Column (4) shows that
the magnitude of the coefficient is stable, or if anything increases (in absolute value) when
adding the triple interactions with macro-areas dummies. These results provide suggestive
evidence that the positive effect of the Ghost Buildings program on incumbent reelection
likelihood is larger in localities where voters have, on average, stronger preferences for tax
enforcement and where the delivery of public goods is more effective.
Finally, Table 2.10 presents the results of the estimation of the baseline regression model
in Equation 2.7, using the log of town-level government expenditures. Column (1) presents
the reduced-form results, using the post-program indicator based on the provincial mode.
The point estimate is .436 (significant at 10%). The coefficient is stable when instrumenting
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Table 2.9: Ghost Building Intensity and Incumbent Reelection: Heterogeneity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.183⇤⇤⇤ 1.232⇤ 1.063⇤⇤⇤ 1.311⇤⇤
(0.394) (0.684) (0.380) (0.668)
...*Speed of Public Good Provision 0.627⇤ 0.591
(0.380) (0.398)
...*Justify Tax Cheating -0.639⇤ -0.734⇤
(0.364) (0.404)
GBI*Macro Area*Post No Yes No Yes
Observations 25812 25812 25893 25893
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor
is reelected (mean 0.453). Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after
the Ghost Buildings program inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province
Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the modal program inception
year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the ratio between the number
of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels.
GBI*Macro Area*Post is the triple interaction among macro-areas fixed effect, ghost building
intensity and Post All the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year fixed effects,
interactions between macro-areas fixed effects and Post, and an interaction between the
relevant heterogeneity variable for the column and Post. The regression sample includes
all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the incumbent does not face a binding
term-limit. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
the post-program indicator with the provincial one and it is slightly larger when including
interactions among controls and the post-program indicator.46 While the effect of the
program is statistically significant, we also note that it is fairly small. A one standard-
deviation increase in ghost-building intensity increases expenditures by about 1%. We
argue that it is unlikely that this effect explains the whole incumbent reelection effect we
documented earlier in the paper. Consistently with the suggestive evidence provided by the
heterogeneity by tax culture, we suggest that non-monetary factors (e.g., the direct utility
non-evaders derive from catching of the shirkers) must play an important role.
2.6.4 Alternative Explanations
Finally, we use the entire set of our results to argue that the impact on incumbent reelection
probability arising from the increase in tax enforcement more than offsets several alternative
46Appendix Figure B.1 shows that government expenditures satisfy the parallel trend assumption, and
pre-program coefficients are not statistically different from zero.
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Table 2.10: Local Government Expenditures
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Ghost Buildings Intensity * Post 0.488⇤ 0.607⇤⇤⇤
(0.264) (0.207)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post Province 0.436⇤
(0.252)
Extra Controls*Post No No Yes
Observations 74646 74646 74646
The dependent variables is the natural logarithm of town government expenditures.Notes:
Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program
inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal
to one if the election occurs after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost
Building Intensity is defined as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with
ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels. Extra Controls*Post include
Geographic, Socio-Economic, and Mayor Controls interacted with the Post dummy. Refer to Table
2.1 for a list of these variables. All the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year
fixed effects and an interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and Post. Standard errors
are clustered at provincial level. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
potential explanations about the impact of the Ghost Buildings program on voter support
for the local incumbent.
According to the first of these alternative explanations, the publication of the number
of ghost buildings generates information about the incumbent. We believe this to be both
unlikely and inconsistent with our findings. First, the set of ghost buildings is a slow moving
stock variable that is likely to have accumulated over decades, rather than a reflection of
just the most recent years. Most of the buildings found by the Agenzia del Territorio were
not newly constructed. The existence of a term limit, paired with the fact that the time to
complete a building in Italy is generally longer than most of the other OECD countries,
suggests that most of these buildings could not have been built while the incumbent was in
office. Second, we notice that voters who could potentially receive information from the
publication are most likely the ones who were not evading before the program, as evaders
already knew about their own evasion.
Keeping this premise in mind, our results rule out this alternative explanation. In one
version of this alternative story, voters, after learning about low levels of evasion detected by
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the program, reward the current mayor for having properly enforced tax payment in the
past. This hypothesis predicts a negative impact of the detected ghost building intensity on
incumbent reelection in post-program elections, and as such it is obviously inconsistent with
our baseline results. In another version of this alternative explanation, voters reward an
incumbent mayor for having allowed high levels of evasion in the past. First, this contradicts
the intuition that non evaders, rather than those previously evading, are the ones who
are potentially acquiring new information. Second, it is unlikely since the purpose of the
program, and therefore the publication, was to shut down the evasion opportunity. Third, it
is at odds with the fact that the positive impact of program intensity on incumbent reelection
is lower in regions with higher tolerance for tax evasion. Fourth, it is inconsistent with our
results showing that towns with higher registration levels are more likely, rather than less
likely, to reelect an incumbent mayor.
In a second potential alternative explanation, the program gives an incumbent an
electoral rent by allowing her to not register the targeted ghost buildings, for instance
by reporting errors in the results generated by the mapping process.47 If this were the
case, we would expect the positive impact of the program to be stronger in regions with
higher tolerance for tax evasion. We find the opposite to be the case. In addition, such an
explanation is inconsistent with the result that a higher share of registered ghost buildings
at the time of a local election increases reelection likelihood. The results of this section
provide strong evidence that it is the additional tax enforcement induced by the program
that drives the increase in the reelection prospects of the incumbent.
2.7 Conclusion
A rapidly growing literature shows that interventions that improve the “technology” of tax
enforcement — third party reporting, cross-checking, or better auditing algorithms — can
47For example, the press agency of one of the mayor of a city in our sample, Capaccio Paestum, explicitly
criticized the “excessive media attention” to the program, indicating how the unregistered buildings in that city
were due to “citizens’ needs” (Comune di Capaccio Paestum, 2010).
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substantially reduce tax evasion. Yet, political incentives to adopt these technologies are also
of crucial importance. Policymakers will delay or prevent enforcement policies if they are
bound to lose support from them. In spite of this, little is known about the electoral impact
of fighting tax evasion. This paper provides evidence of a positive interaction between
technological improvements in tax payer monitoring and political incentives. Specifically,
local incumbents are shown to obtain positive political returns — an increase in their
reelection likelihood — from the Ghost Building program, a nationwide anti tax evasion
policy in Italy which was based on a new enforcement technology.
Underlying tax culture — broadly defined as the individual propensity and social norms
determining evasion for a given level of technology — is another important determinant
of tax compliance. It shapes the enforcement level a government can achieve for a given
enforcement technology. We show that tax culture affects the political returns to undertaking
anti tax evasion policies. The increase in incumbent reelection probabilities in response to
the Ghost Buildings program is larger in areas with lower self-reported tolerance for tax
evasion. Finally, we document that the political returns to enforcement policies are higher
when the government in more efficient in public goods provision.
The findings of the paper have two important policy implications. First, they provide a
framework for thinking about the political feasibility of policies that increase visibility of
tax evasion, thus lowering the monitoring costs and increasing policymakers’ incentives for
raising enforcement. This has immediate relevance for special interest politics. Concentrated
evader groups might effectively lobby to keep evasion hidden from the public. Yet, they are
unlikely to be able to punish an incumbent who enforces tax compliance after the evasion
becomes broadly visible.
Second, there is potential complementarity among anti tax evasion policies, government
responsiveness, and social preferences for tax compliance. Governments that plan to
implement novel enforcement policies should concurrently attempt to strengthen their
capabilities, for instance by improving the speed at which they respond to citizen’s needs,
or by increasing social stigma associated with tax evasion. This complementarity will likely
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increase the returns politicians obtain from anti tax evasion policies and will thus make
such policies more aligned with political agent incentives.
We are aware that using an identification strategy based on a specific natural experiment
enhances internal validity of our study but might come at the price of lower external validity,
for instance for extrapolating about similar programs in other countries or programs
targeting other taxes. Yet, we speculate that evidence of positive political returns to anti
tax evasion policies in Italy, a country often cited as an example of poor tax culture, will be
a lower bound for other OECD countries. We believe an interesting goal for future work
is to elucidate the potential non-linearity in the relation between tax evasion prevalence
and political returns to enforcement policies. In addition, we believe that complementarity
between enforcement policies and social norms on evasion could potentially be relevant for
policy design in other regions of the world.
Another important dimension of external validity concerns enforcement policies tar-
geting other types of evasion. One of the merits of the Ghost Buildings program is that it
detected the entire stock of evasion. On the other hand, the effectiveness of policies targeting
other tax-concealing activities might vary by the ability of the specific evader to hide. This
might affect how the public would respond. We hope future work will shed light on the
political returns to other enforcement policies around the world.
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Chapter 3
Law, Economics and Culture: Theory
of Mandated Benefits and Evidence
from Maternal Leave Policies1
3.1 Introduction
Mandated maternity leave is one of the key policies that supports continued labor force
participation of women. However, there is a large variation in the length of maternity leave
that countries mandate. Why do some countries mandate that employers provide a long
maternity leave, while others mandate only a short one?
To address this question we present a mandated benefit model, with an employer, and
two types of employees, men and women. The employer is required to provide maternity
leave to women and not to men. The employer’s cost of providing maternity leave is greater
than its value to women, since otherwise there would be no need for the mandate as the
employer would freely choose to provide the leave (Summers 1989). Therefore, when the
employer is free to discriminate between men and women in their wages, women’s wage
and employment goes down due to the mandate.
1Co-authored with Yehonatan Givati.
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We then incorporate into the model society’s attitudes towards gender based discrimi-
nation. In a society where there is some negative view of gender based discrimination the
employer is not free to treat men and women differently. This could be the result of a social
sanction imposed on employers that treat men and women too differently, or because of
a legal provision that restricts the extent of permissible discrimination. Formally, the less
willing society is to tolerate gender based discrimination the less able the employer is to
discriminate between men and women in their wages.
When gender based wage discrimination is restricted, mandated maternity leave can ben-
efit women, as shown by Jolls (2000, 2006), since men bear some of the cost of the mandated
leave. We show that the less society is willing to tolerate gender based discrimination the
longer the maternity leave it will provide. Intuitively, when society is relatively intolerant
of gender based discrimination employers are less able to pass on to women the cost of
maternity leave. This means that an increase in the length of maternity leave has a smaller
effect on women’s wages, and therefore a longer leave will benefit them.
To see whether the model’s predictions are supported by the data, we use data on
length of maternity leave in different countries, as well as other economic, political and
demographic controls. Looking for a measure of society’s tolerance of gender based discrim-
ination, we begin by using answers to the World Value Survey. In a cross sectional analysis
we show that countries where gender based discriminatory views are more prevalent have
shorter maternity leave, which is consistent with the prediction of our model.
However, because answers to surveys may be endogenous to current policies, we look
for a measure of society’s attitudes towards gender based discrimination for which concerns
of reverse causation are mitigated. To do so we rely on recent research in psychology and
linguistics according to which language shapes a person’s view of the world. This view,
known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity, originally advanced by Edward
Sapir (1929) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956), is well summarized by the psychologist Lera
Boroditsky (2010):
Patterns in language offer a window on a culture’s dispositions and priorities. . .
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new research shows us that the languages we speak not only reflect or express
our thoughts, but also shape the very thoughts we wish to express. . . As we
uncover how languages and their speakers differ from one another, we discover
that human nature too can differ dramatically, depending on the languages we
speak.
The stable grammatical feature we focus on is personal pronouns. Languages differ
in how many of their personal pronouns are gender differentiated. We collected data on
the number cases of gender differentiated pronouns in 33 languages. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time that this variable has been systematically coded and used
in an empirical quantitative work. Using individual answers to the World Values Survey,
while exploiting only within country variation, we shows that speakers of languages with
more cases of gender differentiated personal pronouns are more likely to have gender
based discriminatory views. Intuitively, a language that routinely compels you to specify
gender when using personal pronouns increases your awareness and acceptance of gender
differences. This is consistent with the linguistic relativity principle, and supports our use
of this feature of languages as a proxy for attitudes towards gender based discrimination.
Using our new linguistic measure in a cross sectional analysis, we find that the more
cases of gender differentiated personal pronouns a language that is spoken in a country
has, the shorter the maternity leave that a country provides, which is consistent with the
prediction of our model.
The question why countries vary in their mandated maternity leave policies has been of
central concern to legal scholars. In particular, the focus has been on explaining why the
U.S. mandates only limited maternity benefits, as opposed to the more expansive benefits
mandated in certain European countries (Dowd 1989, Issacharoff and Rosenblum 1994,
Schuchmann 1995, Grill 1996, Pelletier 2006, Levmore 2007, Suk 2010). The reasons for the
different policies mentioned in these papers include: different approaches to the role of
the state (European countries being social welfare states, and the U.S. being individualistic
and market oriented), different demographic needs (low fertility in Europe relative to the
U.S.), differing goals of the feminist movement (striving for equal treatment in the U.S., and
for special treatment in Europe), and different legal structures for providing benefits (in
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the U.S. antidiscrimination law is relied upon, which places maternity and medical leave
under the same legal regime, while in Europe maternity leave is covered by special laws).
In our empirical analysis we control, where possible, for these alternative explanations.
More importantly, we expand the analysis significantly, and instead of comparing the U.S.
with a couple of European countries we utilize data on maternity leave policies and their
possible determinants in around 80 countries. The advantages of large sample analysis
when addressing comparative law questions are well noted in Spamann (2009).
That maternity leave laws are determined endogenously is in the spirit of Aghion,
Alesina and Trebbi (2004), who analyze the endogenous choice of political institutions.
Along the same lines Aghion, Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2010) analyze the feedback
between regulation and distrust, Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini and Troiano (2010) analyze the
relation between social capital and political accountability, and Givati (2011) analyzes the
endogenous determination of plea bargaining regimes.2 The paper is also related to the
literature on the effects of culture on economic policies and outcomes (Putnam 1993, 2000;
Fukuyama 1995; Bisin and Verdier 2000, 2001; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006, 2008,
2009; Tabellini 2008; Alesina and Giuliano 2010).
(Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006, 2008, 2009;
Tabellini 2008).
This part proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model. Section 3.3 lays out our
empirical strategy. Section 3.4 shows that accounting for paternity leave and multilingual
countries does not affect our results, and that they are not driven by countries where Arabic
is spoken. It also discusses the possibility of an alternative channel that is consistent with
our results. Section 3.5 concludes.





An employer uses labor (L) for production, with the following production function:
F(L) = ZL  1
2
L2 (3.1)
where Z is some large parameter. The price of the good produced is normalized to equal
one.
The population in the economy consists of a unit mass of men and a unit mass of women.
Because of government regulation the employer is legally required to provide maternity
leave of length µ to women. This imposes a cost c(µ) on the employer, when employing
women, and its value to women is v(µ). The utility functions of men and women, Um and
Uw respectively, are:
Um = WmLm   12L
2
m (3.2)
Uw = (Ww + v(µ))Lw   12L
2
w
where Wm and Lm are the wage and labor of men, and Ww and Lw are the wage and labor
of women.
We assume that c(µ) > v(µ), that is the employer’s cost of providing maternity leave
is greater than its value to women. If this was not the case there would be no need
for the mandate, as the employer would freely choose to provide the leave to women
absent government regulation (Summers 1989). Assume also that c0(µ), v0(µ) > 0, and that
c00(µ)   0 > v00(µ), that is women’s marginal benefit of maternity leave is positive and
decreasing, while the employer’s marginal cost of maternity is positive and non-decreasing.
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3.2.2 Gender Based Discrimination
We first analyze the case where the employer is free to offer different wages to men and
women. Using expression 3.2 we can derive men’s and women’s labor supply:
Lm = Wm (3.3)
Lw = Ww + v(µ)
Intuitively, men’s labor supply is increasing with their wages, and women’s labor supply is
increasing with their wages and with their valuation of maternity leave.
The employer solves a separate maximization problem for men and women, taking in






F(L¯m + Lw)  (Ww + c(µ))Lw
These yield the employer’s demand function for men and for women:
Wm = Z  Lm   L¯w (3.4)
Ww = Z  L¯m   Lw   c(µ)
Naturally, the demand curve for men is decreasing with the number of men employed, and
the demand curve for women is decreasing with the number of women employed. Note that
an increase in the number of women employed shifts the demand curve for men downward,
and an increase in the number of men employed or in the cost of providing maternity leave
shifts the demand curve for women downward.
We can now plug in the labor supply functions into the demand functions, and solve for










The number of men and women employed, L⇤m and L⇤w respectively, can be immediately
derived from the labor supply functions in expression 3.3.
Note from expression 3.5 that W⇤m  W⇤w = c(µ), that is the difference in wages between
men and women is equal to the cost of providing maternity leave. Intuitively, since relative
to men employing women imposes a cost c(µ) on the employer, women’s wage is lower
than men’s wage by this cost.
Let us denote the equilibrium wages and employment before maternity leave is mandated
as W 0m, W 0w, L0m, L0w. It is easy to see that when no maternity leave is mandated, that is when
c(µ) = v(µ) = 0, we get W 0m = W 0w = L0m = L0w = 13Z. Note that for men W
⇤
m > W 0m and
L⇤m > L0m, and for women W⇤w <W 0w and L⇤w < L0w. That is, as a result of the mandated leave
women’s wage and employment goes down, whereas men’s wage and employment goes up.
Figure 3.1 depicts the labor market for men and women.
Figure 3.1: The Labor Market for Men (left) and Women (right)
The introduction of mandated maternity leave shifts women’s supply curve outward
by v(µ), and the demand curve for women inward by c(µ). Since c(µ) > v(µ) this results
in a decrease in employment of women, which in turn shifts the demand curve for men
outward, as expression 3.4 shows. The resulting increase in employment of men causes a
further shift inward in the demand curve for women.
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3.2.3 Intolerance of Gender Based Discrimination
We now analyze how society’s tolerance of gender based discrimination affects the analysis
presented above. In a society where there is some negative view of gender based discrimi-
nation the employer is not free to treat men and women differently. This could be the result
of a social sanction imposed on employers that treat men and women too differently, or
because of a legal provision that restricts the extent of permissible discrimination.
To capture society’s attitudes towards gender based discrimination formally, we impose
the following condition:
Ww  Wm   1l c(µ) (3.6)
where l   1. Recall thatW⇤m W⇤w = c(µ) . l reflects an external constraint on gender based
wage discrimination, and therefore captures how much society is willing to tolerate gender
based discrimination. The less willing society is to tolerate gender based discrimination the
higher l is, and therefore the smaller the difference between the wage of men and women.
To make the constraint in expression 3.6 meaningful, we assume that the employer must
hire women and men willing to work for the wages offered.
Jolls (2000, 2006) also analyzes the effect of mandated benefit that is targeted at a specific
population, when employers cannot discriminate in wages between the different populations.
Here, we employ a similar framework, but instead of imposing that the wage of men and
women must be equal, we consider the extent to which the wage of men and women can be
different, and analyze the consequences of a change in the constraint on wage differentiation
on the level of mandated benefits.
Plugging in the labor supply functions from expression 3.3 for Lm and Lw in the demand








[Z  L¯m   v(µ)  c(µ)]
Imposing the constraint from expression 3.6 on the conditions in expression 3.7, and solving
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[Z  v(µ)  (l+ 1
l
)c(µ)]
The number of men and women employed, L˜m and L˜w respectively, can again be immediately
derived from the labor supply functions in expression 3.3.
Note that when l = 1, that is when society is indifferent to gender based discrimination,
we get W˜m = W⇤m and W˜w = W⇤w. Also, note that ∂W˜m∂l < 0, while
∂W˜w
∂l > 0, that is as
society becomes less tolerant of gender based discrimination men’s wage goes down, while
women’s wage goes up.
Figure 3.2 depicts the labor market for men and women in a society that is not indifferent
to gender based discrimination, that is when l > 1.
Figure 3.2: The Labor Market for Men (left) and Women (right) when Society is Intolerant of Discrimination
In equilibrium, the shift inward of the demand for women by c(µ) as a result of the
introduction of mandated maternity leave is offset by a shift outward of the same curve as
a result of a decrease in the employment of men. The increase in employment of women
shifts the demand curve for men inward. One can see that, relative to the case where there
is no mandate, men’s wage and employment go down, women’s employment goes up while
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their wage goes down.
3.2.4 Optimal Length of Leave
A social planner maximizes social welfare, which depends on the utility of men and women,
SW = SW(Um,Uw). Following Diamond (1975), let us define the social marginal utility of
men’s and women’s income, ∂SW∂Um = bm, and
∂SW
∂Uw = 1. Assume that bm < 1, which means
that the social marginal utility of women’s income is greater than that of men’s. This reflects
a case where men’s utility is higher than women’s, and the social welfare function is concave,
expressing an aversion to inequality in the distribution of utility levels between men and
women. The social planner chooses the length of maternity leave to maximize social welfare.
To simplify the analysis, and develop the basic intuition, let us assume that bm = 0
(Appendix C.1 presents the full analysis where bm > 0).3 Differentiating the social welfare
function with respect to the length of leave, µ, we employ the envelope theorem and ignore
∂Lw







Using women’s wage from expression 3.8, we obtain the following first order condition:
v0(µ) = (1+ l
2l
)c0(µ) (3.9)
The length of maternity leave for which expression 3.9 hold is denoted by µ˜.4 Intuitively,
increasing the length of maternity leave has a direct beneficial effect on women, but it also
results in reduction in women’s wage, which harms women. The left-hand side of expression
3.9 is women’s direct gain from increasing the length of maternity leave. The right-hand
side of expression 3.9 is the women’s loss from increasing the length of maternity leave,
since it is the increase in the cost imposed on the employer when employing women which
3This assumption could also reflect a situation where maternity leave is introduced only to benefit women,
perhaps due to political considerations.
4This is a maximum, since the second order condition holds: v00(µ)  ( 1+l2l )c00(µ) < 0.
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reduces women’s wages, attenuated by society’s intolerance of gender based discrimination.
At the optimum the marginal gain and marginal loss from a longer maternity leave are
equal.
3.2.5 The Effect of Attitudes on Leave
How do society’s attitudes towards gender based discrimination affect the length of the
maternity leave mandated? To address this question we look at the effect of l, which captures
society’s tolerance of gender based discrimination, on the chosen length of maternity leave,
µ˜.






2l2[( 1+l2l )c00(µ)  v00(µ)]
> 0 (3.10)
That is, the less society is willing to tolerate gender based discrimination the longer the
maternity leave it will provide. Intuitively, when society is relatively intolerant of gender
based discrimination employers are less able to pass on to women the cost of maternity
leave. This means that an increase in the length of maternity leave has a smaller effect on
women’s wages, and therefore a longer leave can be chosen.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Cross Country Correlation
As section 3.2 explains, we are interested in the relationship between society’s tolerance
of gender based discrimination and the length of maternity leave it provides. To look at
attitudes towards gender based discrimination, we use data collected in the World Value
Survey (see appendix C.2 for source information). In particular, we look at respondents’
answer to the following question: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a
job than women? Agree/ Disagree". For each country we use the percentage of respondents
who thought that when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women,
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Maternity Leave and Attitudes Reagression
Mean S.D. Min Max
Days of Maternity Leave 137.1 87.09 60 480
Men Have More
Right to a Job
46.62 23.27 5 100
GDP per capita 18, 582 14, 752 886 79, 813
Govt. Share of GDP 16.25 5.9 6.32 36.54
Population (in thousands) 77, 254 212, 942 329 1, 354, 146
Fertility 2.03 0.86 1.2 5.9
Women Share
of Parliament
18.26 10.54 0 45
averaged over the waves of the World Value Survey.5
In a cross sectional analysis, we estimate the correlation between the length of maternity
leave and the percentage of respondents in a country who think men should have more
right to a job than women, which we interpret as capturing attitudes towards gender based
discrimination. The data on the length of maternity leave in different countries, as well as
other demographic and political variable we use, are from the United Nations Statistical
Division, Statistics and Indicators on Women and Men. GDP data is taken from the Penn
World Table (see appendix C.2 for source information). Summary statistics for the variables
we include in our regression are presented in table 3.1.
From table 3.1 it is clear that there is a large variation in the length of maternity leave
that countries mandate, from 60 days (Uganda and the Philippines) to 480 days (Sweden).
Similarly, there is a large variation in the percentage of respondents in each country who
think that men should have more right to a job than women.
Table 3.2 presents the results of the OLS regression. The dependent variable in Table 3.2
is the number of days of maternity leave a country mandates. Standard errors are robust.
In specification (1) we can see that there is a strong negative correlation between the
length of maternity leave and the percentage of respondents who think men should have
5We calculated the data for every country and wave of survey using the World Value Survey online analysis,
to avoid any risk of manipulation of the raw data. Then an average was taken for every country over the four
first waves of the World Value Survey. The fifth wave was not included here since it was not available for online
analysis.
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Table 3.2: Maternity Leave and Attitudes
Dependent Variable: Days of Maternity Leave
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Have More








































R2 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.25
Number of obs. 73 73 73 73
⇤p  0.1, ⇤⇤p  0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p  0.01
Standard errors are robust
more right to a job than women. Specifically, for every additional percent of respondents
who think men should have more right to a job than women the length of maternity leave
decreases by 1.4 days.
In specification (2) we control for GDP per capita, government share of GDP and
population. GDP per capita is not correlated with the length of maternity leave. Government
share of GDP, which can be thought of as a proxy for the size of the welfare state, is
positively correlated with the length of maternity leave, but this correlation is not statistically
significant. The population of country is negatively correlated with the length of maternity
leave. The effect of attitudes on leave remains statistically and economically significant after
adding these controls.
In Specification (3) we control for the share of women in parliament. The coefficient is
positive, which may reflect a political influence on length of leave, but the coefficient is not
statistically significant. The effect of attitudes on leave remains statistically and economically
significant.
In specification (4) we control for fertility rate. The coefficient is negative and statistically
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significant, that is a lower fertility rate is associated with a longer leave, which could reflect
a policy intended to increase fertility by providing maternity leave. The effect of attitudes
on leave remains statistically and economically significant even after controlling for fertility.
In all specifications in table 3.2 we see that there is a strong negative correlation between
the length of maternity leave and gender based discriminatory views, and this effect is
statistically and economically significant. That is, the more people in a country think that
when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women, the shorter the
maternity leave that a country mandates. This is consistent with the prediction of our model,
that the more tolerant a society is towards gender based discrimination the shorter the
maternity leave it mandates.
3.3.2 Language and Attitudes
Linguistic Relativity
As subsection 3.3.1 shows, there is a strong correlation between the length of maternity
leave and gender based discriminatory views. However, the main challenge in looking at
the effect of attitudes on policies is that current measure of attitudes through surveys may
be influenced by current policies. In our case, a maternity leave policy that is favorable to
women might produce survey answers that are favorable to women. Ideally, to provide
a correlation between long run attitudes and current policies we would like to have a
survey done centuries ago and estimate the correlation. We try to deal with this issue using
linguistic relativity.
Linguistic relativity is the idea that thought is shaped by language, or more precisely
that the particular language we speak influences the way we think about reality. This notion
was first advanced by Edward Sapir (1929), but was mostly developed in the writing of his
student, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956). The main thrust of what is known as the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis is well summarized by the linguist Guy Deutscher (2010a):
When your language routinely obliges you to specify certain types of information,
it forces you to be attentive to certain details in the world and to certain aspects
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of experience that speakers of other languages may not be required to think
about all the time. And since such habits of speech are cultivated from the
earliest age, it is only natural that they can settle into habits of mind that go
beyond language itself, affecting your experiences, perceptions, associations,
feelings, memories and orientation in the world.
Although the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was rejected by sceintists for many years due
to lack of supporting evidence, in the past fifteen years a solid body of empirical work
has emerged to support it (see surveys of the literature in Gumperz and Levinson 1996,
Lucy 1997, Boroditsky 2003, Deutscher 2010b, Boroditsky 2011). Studies in psychology and
linguistics, each focusing on a specific cross-linguistic difference, have confirmed the effect
of language on thought. For example, speaker of languages that use cardinal-direction
terms – north, south, east, and west – to define space, instead of defining space relative to
an observer, have superior navigational ability and spatial knowledge, and apply the same
frame of reference in recall and recognition (Levinson 2003). The way languages divide the
color spectrum into colors leads to differences in color discrimination (Winawer et al. 2007).
Speakers of languages that do not make significant grammatical distinction between objects
and substances (for example, when counting them), pay more attention to the material of
objects rather than to their shape (Lucy and Gaskins 2001).
Applying the linguistic relativity principle to our research, we look for a grammatical
feature of languages that is correlated with attitudes towards gender based discrimination.
Gender Differentiated Personal Pronouns
One of the stable grammatical features of a language is its use of personal pronouns.
Personal pronouns are gender differentiated in some cases, but in other cases they are not.
Languages differ in how many of their personal pronouns are gender differentiated. For
example, as shown in table 3.3, Spanish has four cases of gender differentiated pronouns
(third person singular, first person plural, second person plural, and third person plural),
whereas English has only one case of gender differentiated pronoun (third person singular).
We code, using grammar books, the number of cases of gender differentiated personal
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Table 3.3: Personal Pronouns in English and Spanish
English Spanish
Singular Plural Singular Plural
Person Masc. Fem. Masc. Fem. Masc. Fem. Masc. Fem.
1st I We yo nosotros nosotras
2nd You You tú vosotros vosotras
3rd He She They él ella ellos ellas
pronouns in 33 languages (see data in appendix C.3). To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time that this variable has been systematically coded and used in an empirical
quantitative work.6
Applying the linguistic relativity principle to our research, a language that routinely
compels you to specify gender when using personal pronouns increases your awareness
and acceptance of gender differences. Thus, the number of gender differentiated personal
pronouns can be used as a proxy for attitudes towards gender based discrimination, where
the fewer gender differentiated personal pronouns a languages has the less tolerant its
speakers should be towards gender based discrimination.
We are not the first to look at the effects of variation in grammatical gender across
languages. Guiora et al. (1982) study the development of gender identity in children who
speak Hebrew, English and Finnish, as the sex-determined grammatical features of these
languages, and in particular their use of gender differentiated pronouns, vary from almost
zero in Finnish, through very low in English, to very high in Hebrew. They find a direct
relationship between gender loading in the native language and gender identity attainment.
Hill and Mannheim (1992) note the "Whorfian effect" of gender differentiated personal
pronouns, and more recently, Boroditsky et al. (2003) find that the way languages assign
grammatical gender to inanimate objects affects how their speakers view these objects.
In the economics literature, other features of language are used as a proxy for culture by
Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwarz (2006) and Tabellini (2008).
6We selected the languages we used based on how widely they were spoken, and the availability of grammar
books for us to rely on. We estimate that the languages we currently have cover approximately 53% of world
population.
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Is Language Correlated with Attitudes?
Before turning to aggregate cross-country data, it is natural to ask whether our linguistic
variable is correlated with attitudes toward gender based discrimination. To do so we use
again data collected in the World Value Survey. In particular, we look at individual answers
to the question: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women?
Agree/ Disagree".7 One of the advantages of the World Value Survey data is that it allows
us distinguish between the country where the respondent lives (from the question "In which
country do you live?") and the language the respondent speaks (from the question: "What
language do you normally speak at home?"). Every respondent was assigned the number
of cases of gender differentiated pronouns the language that he reported to be speaking
at home has. If indeed language is correlated with attitudes, as we argue, then we should
find that the number of cases of gender differentiated pronouns is associated with a higher
likelihood of agreeing with the above statement on men’s right to a job.
Summary statistics for the variables we include in our regression, all taken from the
World Value Survey, are presented in table 3.4
Table 3.5 presents the results. The dependent variable in Table 3.5 is a binary variable
representing the person’s answer to the question wether men have more right to job than
women when jobs are scarce. The variable takes the value 1 if the respondent agreed with
the statement, and zero if the respondent disagreed with it. The table presents marginal
effects of a probit regression. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the language level,
to allow for arbitrary patterns of correlation by language. We include controls for country
and year of survey fixed effects. Thus, we only exploit the within country and within year
variation in responses, which means we hold constant policies, institutions and laws that
might also have an impact on individual attitudes.
7We use this question because it is directly related to gender based discrimination in the workforce, which is
what our model is about, and because it seems to closely reflect attitudes towards gender based discrimination
more than any other question on the World Value Survey. As a robustness check, we looked at other gender
related questions in the World Value Survey, and find similar results for questions on whether men make better
political leaders than women, whether a woman has to have children to be fulfilled, and whether a wife must
always obey her husband.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for World Value Survey Regression
Mean S.D. Min Max
When jobs are scarce men should have
more right to a job than women
0.39 0.49 0 1
Gender Differentiated
Personal Pronouns
2.14 1.51 0 4
Male 0.48 0.50 0 1
Married 0.60 0.49 0 1
High School 0.34 0.47 0 1
College or more 0.16 0.36 0 1
Income 4.60 2.47 1 10
Age 41.4 16.2 15 98
In specification (1) we see that the more gender differentiated pronouns a language has
the more likely the respondent is to think that when jobs are scarce men have more right to
a job than women, and this effect is statistically significant.
In specification (2) we control for the gender of the respondent. Unsurprisingly, men are
more likely to think that when jobs are scarce men have more right to a job than women.
However, even after controlling for the gender of the respondent, the effect of language on
the respondents answer remains significant.
In specification (3) we see that older people and people who are married are more likely
to agree with the statement, while people with higher income are less likely to do so. Still,
the effect of language on the respondents answer remains significant.
In specification (4) we see that the more educated a person is the less likely the person
is to agree with the statement. Still, even after controlling for education, the more gender
differentiated pronouns a language has the more likely the respondent is to think that when
jobs are scarce men have more right to a job than women.
That speakers of languages with more cases of gender differentiated personal pronouns
are more likely to have gender based discriminatory views is consistent with the linguistic
relativity principle, and supports our use of this feature of languages as a proxy for attitudes
towards gender based discrimination.
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Table 3.5: Language and Attitudes
Dependent Variable:
When jobs are scarce men should have
more right to a job than women







































Country FE X X X X
Survey Year FE X X X X
Number of Obs. 96, 233 96, 233 96, 233 96, 233
⇤p  0.1, ⇤⇤p  0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p  0.01
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the language level
3.3.3 Maternity Leave and Language
In a cross sectional analysis, we estimate the correlation between the length of maternity
leave and gender differentiated personal pronouns, interpreted as a proxy for attitudes
towards gender based discrimination. In addition to the data that was used before, in
subsection 3.3.1, here we associate each country in the sample with the language most
commonly spoken in it, based on the CIA World Factbook and Ethnologue (see appendix C.2
for source information). Summary statistics for the variables we include in our regression
are presented in Table 3.6.
From Table 3.6 it is clear that there is a large variation in the length of maternity leave
that countries mandate. In our sample, the length of maternity leave goes from 45 days
(Bahrain and UAE) to 480 days (Sweden). Similarly, there is a large variation in the number
of gender differentiated personal pronouns of languages spoken in the countries in our
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics for Maternity Leave and Language Regression
Mean S.D. Min Max
Days of Maternity Leave 118.0 78.12 45 480
Gender Differentiated
Personal Pronouns
2.49 1.51 0 4
GDP per capita 18, 837 14, 828 1, 309 79, 813
Govt. Share of GDP 15.98 6.75 5.8 37.97
Population (in thousands) 60, 616 202, 116 257 1, 354, 146
Fertility 2.21 0.94 1.3 5.8
Women Share
of Parliament
16.84 10.7 0 45
sample.
Table 3.7 presents the results of the OLS regression, which we consider our main results.
The dependent variable in Table 3.7 is the number of days of maternity leave a country
mandates. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the language level.
In specification (1) we can see that there is a strong negative correlation between the
length of maternity leave and our linguistic measure. The coefficient is negative, statistically
and economically significant. Specifically, for every additional case of gender differentiated
pronouns the length of maternity leave decreases by approximately 20 days.
In specification (2) we control for GDP per capita, government share of GDP and
population. GDP per capita is not correlated with the length of maternity leave. Government
share of GDP, which can be thought of as a proxy for the size of the welfare state, is
positively correlated with the length of maternity leave, but this correlation is not statistically
significant. The population of country is negatively correlated with the length of maternity
leave. The effect of language on leave remains statistically and economically significant after
adding these controls.
In Specification (3) we control for the share of women in parliament. The coefficient
is positive and statistically significant. Specifically, an increase of one percent in women’s
representation in parliament is associated with an increase in the length of mandated
maternity leave of 2 days. This results seems intuitive, and captures the political channel
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Table 3.7: Maternity Leave and Language
Dependent Variable: Days of Maternity Leave










































R2 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.28
Number of obs. 81 81 81 81
⇤p  0.1, ⇤⇤p  0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p  0.01
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the language level
that affects the length of maternity leave. However, even after controlling for this political
channel the effect of language on leave remains statistically and economically significant.
In specification (4) we control for fertility rate. A lower fertility rate is associated with
a longer leave, which could reflect a policy intended to increase fertility by providing
maternity leave, but this effect is not statistically significant. The effect of language on leave
remains statistically and economically significant even after controlling for fertility.
The results shown in Table 3.7 are consistent with our model, that is with the prediction
that lower tolerance of gender based discrimination, which we capture here through our
language proxy, is associated with a longer mandated maternity leave.
3.3.4 Instrumental Variable Approach
If language structure, that is the number of gender differentiated personal pronouns, affects
the length of maternity leave only through its effect on attitudes towards gender based
discrimination, one can employ an instrumental variable approach to look at the effect of
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Table 3.8: Instrumental Variable Approach
Dependent Variable:
(1) & (3):
When jobs are scarce men should have
more right to a job than women
(2) & (4): Days of Maternity Leave
First Stage IV First Stage IV LIML









































Instrument F-Statistic 10.98 2.94
Number of obs. 55 55 55 55
⇤p  0.1, ⇤⇤p  0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p  0.01
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the language level
attitudes on length of leave.
Table 3.8 presents the results of the instrumental variable regression, with standard
errors that are robust and clustered at the language level.
Specification (1) presents the first stage regression, where the dependent variable is the
percentage of people in a country who think that when jobs are scarce men should have
more right to a job than women. We can see that there is a strong, statistically significant
positive correlation between our linguistic measure and attitudes. Specifically, for every
additional case of gender differentiated pronouns the share of people in the population who
think that men have more right to a job than women increases by approximately 7.1 percent.
Specification (2) presents the second stage regression, where the dependent variable is
the number of days of maternity leave, and we instrument for attitudes with our linguistic
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measure. With this instrument we get a strong, statistically significant negative correlation
between attitudes and the length of leave. For every additional percent of respondents who
think that men should have more right to a job than women the length of maternity leave
decreases by 2.3 days.
In specifications (3) and (4) we repeat the exercise in specification (1) and (2), only with
all the controls. Note that in specification (3), the instrument is weak (F below 10). Since the
Two Stage Least Squares has been found to have poor properties in such a settings, we use
in specification (4) Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimation.8 We get again a
strong, statistically significant negative correlation between attitudes, instrumented with
our linguistic measure, and the length of leave.9
Comparing tables 3.8 and 3.2, one notices that the IV estimates are larger than the OLS
estimates. This however is relatively common (see, for example, the return on schooling
literature, reviewed in Card 2001), and can be explained by the fact that the use of IV may
reduce the downward attenuation bias due to measurement error, or by the fact that in the
set of countries which the IV estimates are identified off, that is countries where attitudes
vary because of a change in our linguistic measure, the effect of attitudes on the length of
leave is higher than in the set of all countries used for the OLS estimates.
The results in Table 3.8 support our claim that lower tolerance of gender based discrimi-
nation is associated with a longer mandated maternity leave.
3.4 Discussion
In this section we discuss some concerns that might arise with respect to our model and our
results.
8For the literature on weak instruments see, among others, Buse (1992), Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995),
and Steiger and Stock (1997).
9One possible concern could be that other cultural variables that are affected by our linguistic measure are
having an independent effect on the length of maternity leave. As a falsification test, we perform the same
analysis for other World Values Survey variables that we found being correlated with our linguistic measure in
the within country framework. We find that none of these variable is correlated with length of leave, whether
with OLS or with IV. Results are available upon request.
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Paternal Leave In our model we assumed that mandated leave is provided only to women
and not to men. Since some countries mandate paternity leave as well as maternity leave,
one can question the validity of our assumption.
It is important to note that our results do not hinge on the assumption that paternity
leave is not mandated. What matters is that mandated paternity leave is shorter than
mandated maternity leave, which makes hiring women rather than men relatively more
costly. Thus, our assumption that mandated leave is provided only to women and not to
men is simply a normalization.
Turning to the data, if what matters is the difference between the lengths of maternity
leave and paternity leave, one can argue that our use of maternity leave as the dependent
variable in tables 3.2 and 3.7 is incorrect. However, it turns out that accounting for paternity
leave does not change our results. The reason is that most countries do not mandate a
paternity leave, and those which do mandate only a very short one.
In table 3.9 we replicate tables 3.2 and 3.7, but instead of using the length of maternity
leave as the dependent variable, we use the difference between the lengths of maternity leave
and paternity leave, where data on paternity leave is taken from the Maternity Protection
Database of the International Labor Organization (see appendix C.2 for source information).
One can see from table 3.9 that accounting for paternity leave does not affect our
empirical results.
Multilingual Countries Our coding associates each country with the language most
commonly spoken in it. This may pose a problem for some of the truly multilingual
countries.
To address this issue we redefined, where possible, the number gender differentiated
personal pronouns in these countries as a weighted average of the number of gender
differentiated pronouns in the languages spoken in these countries, with weights given by
the percentage of the population actually speaking each language. Using these weighted
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Table 3.9: Difference between Maternity and Paternity Leave
Dependent Variable: Difference between Days of Maternity Leaveand Days of Paternity Leave








































R2 0.14 0.27 0.13 0.24
Number of obs. 81 81 73 73
⇤p  0.1, ⇤⇤p  0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p  0.01
Standard errors are robust, and clustered at the language level in (1) and (2)
averages does not change the results we get.10 For simplicity we choose to use the language
most commonly spoken in our coding.
Arab Countries A concern that might arise is that our results are driven by countries
where Arabic is spoken. As appendix C.3 notes, Arabic has relatively many cases of gender
differentiated personal pronouns, and there are relatively many countries where Arabic is
spoken. The concern is that if our results are driven by countries where Arabic is spoken
they might be capturing another channel that is unique to these countries and that we do
not control for, rather than attitudes towards gender based discrimination.
However, dropping the countries where Arabic is spoken from our sample does not
10The countries in the sample affected by this weighting are Belgium, Canada and Switzerland. If a language
in a country is not coded it receives a zero weight. Note that for some multilingual countries where the different
spoken languages have the same number of gender differentiated pronouns, such as Ukraine, where both
Ukrainian and Russina have one case of gender differentiated pronouns, this procedure has no effect.
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change our results. With these countries dropped there is still a strong negative correlation
between the length of maternity leave and our linguistic measure, that is economically and
statistically significant. Results are available upon request.
Direct Effect of Attitudes on Leave In the standard mandated benefit model, which we
present in the beginning of section 3.2, women do not benefit from the introduction of
mandated maternity leave, as the value of the mandated leave is smaller than their resulting
decrease in wages. Furthermore, an increase in the length of mandated leave only harms
women (since c00(µ)  v00(µ) > 0). Thus, in the standard model the more you care about
women the shorter you want the mandated leave to be.
This result is important, since one could argue that our empirical results are not capturing
the dynamics of our model, but rather a more simple effect. That is, one can argue that
intolerance of gender based discrimination is simply a reflection of positive attitudes towards
women, and that our empirical results simply show that countries with a more favorable
attitudes towards women mandate a longer maternity leave. However, as just noted, in the
standard mandated benefit model the more you care about women the shorter you want the
mandated leave to be, which is inconsistent with this alternative explanation to our results.
3.5 Conclusion
Why do some countries mandate that employers provide a long maternity leave, while others
mandate only a short one? This question seems particularly important as maternity leave
is one of the key policies that supports continued labor force participation of women. We
incorporate attitudes towards gender based discrimination into a standard mandated benefit
model where employers provide maternity leave to women and not to men, showing that
the less society is willing to tolerate gender based discrimination the longer the maternity
leave it will provide.
Using the linguistic relativity principle we capture attitudes towards gender based
discrimination with new data on the number of cases of gender differentiated personal
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pronouns across languages. Using this measure we find, in a cross sectional analysis, results
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Supplementary Tables and Figures
This Appendix provides additional information and robustness checks, which are also
discussed in the paper. In particular, we describe the characteristics and sources of the
variables we use (Table A1), and we present further robustness checks:
• diff-in-disc estimates with covariates (Table A2);
• balance tests of time-invariant municipal characteristics (Table A3);
• diff-in-disc estimates on potentially endogenous variables (Table A4);
• falsification tests for the heterogeneity analysis (Table A5, Table A6, and Table A7);
• test of the continuity of the density at 5,000 in the 1991 Census, in the 2001 Census,
and with respect to the difference between the two Censuses (Figure A1);
• placebo tests based on permutation methods (Figure A2 and Figure A3).
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Table A.1: Variables’ description and sources
Variable Definition and measure Available Source
from-to
Deficit Expenditure minus revenues 1997-2004 IMI
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Fiscal gap Expenditure minus revenues 1998-2004 IMI
(net of central transfers and debt service)
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Current outlays Total current expenditure 1998-2004 IMI
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Capital outlays Total capital expenditure 1998-2004 IMI
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Debt service Interest payments on outstanding debt 1998-2004 IMI
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Taxes Total tax revenues 1997-2004 IMI
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Fees & tariffs Total revenues from fees and tariffs 1997-2004 IMI
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Central transfers Total transfers by the central state 1997-2004 IMI
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Other revenues Residual category 1997-2004 IMI
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Real estate tax rate The tax rate on real estate 1997-2004 IFEL-ANCI
From 0.004 to 0.007 of the home value
Income tax surcharge Municipal income tax surcharge 1999-2004 ME-DF
Up to 0.6% of the taxable income
Notes: IMI stands for Italian Ministry of the Interior; IFEL-ANCI stands for Institute for the Local Finance
and Economy of the National Italian Association of Municipalities; ME-DF stands for Italian Ministry of the
Economy, Department of Finance.
Table A1 (contd.): Variables’ description and sources
Variable Definition and Measure Available Source
from-to
Census population Census population of the municipality 1991 and 2001 ISTAT
Young cohorts Ratio of residents aged 0–14 over resident population 1998-2004 ISTAT
Fraction at municipality level
Speed of public good Paid over committed current expenditures 1999-2004 IMI
Fraction at municipality level
Area size Municipal area size 1999-2004 IMI
In km2
Sea level Municipal sea level 1999-2004 IMI
In meters
Taxable income Municipal taxable income mean 1999-2004 ME-DF
Per-resident; 2009 Euros
Female Mayor Equal to 1 if the mayor in office is a woman 1999-2004 IMI
Dummy variable
Mayor’s age Age of the mayor 1999-2004 IMI
Number of years
Mayor’s schooling Years of choosing of the mayor in office 1999-2004 IMI
Number of years
Mayor’s tenure Experience of the mayor in office 1999-2004 IMI
Number of mandates
Term limit Equal to 1 if the mayor in office faces term limit 1999-2004 IMI
Dummy variable
Notes: IMI stands for Italian Ministry of the Interior; IFEL-ANCI stands for Institute for the Local Finance
and Economy of the National Italian Association of Municipalities; ME-DF stands for Italian Ministry of the
Economy, Department of Finance.
Table A.2: The effect of relaxing fiscal rules, estimates with covariates
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
A. Fiscal discipline
Deficit 16.085** 19.265*** 21.094** 23.396*
(8.082) (6.208) (9.283) (12.579)
Fiscal gap 70.704*** 56.734*** 96.748*** 118.962***
(26.436) (20.049) (32.595) (41.570)
B. Expenditures
Current outlays -60.558 -13.958 -44.755 -68.705
(49.861) (32.864) (50.871) (72.117)
Capital outlays 54.450 44.429 102.644 224.342*
(76.831) (59.520) (101.934) (136.181)
Debt service -1.962 -1.077 -1.962 -2.298
(6.107) (3.833) (6.145) (9.151)
C. Revenues
Taxes -56.638** -40.683** -56.863** -93.975***
(23.920) (17.221) (24.024) (30.751)
Fees & tariffs -6.989 -2.700 -2.992 -10.241
(9.676) (7.028) (10.049) (13.341)
Central transfers 52.658** 36.392** 73.692** 93.268**
(23.251) (17.730) (29.036) (36.275)
Other revenues -13.186 17.120 20.996 140.891
(92.763) (67.138) (112.937) (155.552)
D. Tax instruments
Real estate tax rate -0.043* -0.030* -0.058** -0.060*
(0.024) (0.018) (0.026) (0.033)
Income tax surcharge -0.027 -0.053* -0.051 -0.103**
(0.037) (0.029) (0.042) (0.052)
Obs. 2,080 3,068 6,300 6,300
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1999 and 2004. Diff-in-disc estimates of
the impact of relaxing fiscal rules on policy outcomes and tax instruments below 5,000 after 2001. Specifications augmented
by controlling for covariates: yearly dummies, macro areas dummies (i.e. North West, North East, South), area size (in
km2), and sea level (in meters). Estimation methods: Local Linear Regression (LLR) with bandwidth h = 500 or h = 750, as
in equation (1.5); spline polynomial approximation with 3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial, as in equation (1.6). All policy
outcomes are per capita and in 2009 Euros. Tax instruments are in percentage points. Robust standard errors clustered at
the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the
1% level by ***.
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Table A.3: Balance tests of time-invariant characteristics
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
North-West 0.012 0.057 0.043 0.167
(0.109) (0.088) (0.122) (0.152)
North-East 0.072 0.039 0.042 -0.039
(0.088) (0.071) (0.095) (0.115)
Center -0.043 -0.032 -0.071 -0.181
(0.096) (0.079) (0.106) (0.133)
South -0.041 -0.064 -0.013 0.053
(0.075) (0.064) (0.088) (0.110)
Area size -2.791 -0.519 0.043 -7.710
(9.045) (7.377) (10.199) (11.734)
Sea level -10.800 -9.053 -17.736 9.258
(44.481) (34.398) (46.537) (59.757)
Obs. 2,080 3,068 6,300 6,300
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants. Diff-in-disc estimates with changing population levels (1991
Census before 2001 and 2001 Census after 2001). All time-invariant characteristics are dummies except area size (in km2)
and sea level (in meters). Estimation methods: Local Linear Regression (LLR) with bandwidth h = 500 or h = 750; spline
polynomial approximation with 3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.4: Balance tests of potentially endogenous characteristics
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
Taxable income 211.702 -187.577 -230.188 -19.672
(638.019) (491.318) (679.745) (857.344)
Female mayor -0.078 -0.083 -0.112 -0.068
(0.072) (0.064) (0.079) (0.095)
Mayor’s age 0.457 -1.361 -0.770 -0.907
(2.846) (2.166) (3.114) (3.930)
Mayor’s schooling 0.646 0.698 0.818 1.192
(0.838) (0.645) (0.929) (1.155)
Mayor’s tenure 0.551 -0.081 0.444 1.287
(1.378) (1.110) (1.497) (1.848)
No. of parties -0.394 -0.200 -0.498 -0.958
(0.440) (0.346) (0.485) (0.621)
Term limit -0.097 -0.075 -0.136 -0.123
(0.136) (0.107) (0.150) (0.184)
Young cohorts -0.085 -0.083 -0.065 -0.083
(0.141) (0.110) (0.154) (0.198)
Efficiency 0.052 0.044 -0.019 0.035
(0.152) (0.116) (0.165) (0.209)
Obs. 2,080 3,068 6,300 6,300
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants. Baseline diff-in-disc estimates. Taxable income at the municipal
level is per capita and in 2009 Euros; mayor’s age, schooling, and tenure are expressed in years; female mayor and term
limit are dummies; number of parties refer to political parties seating in the city council. See the Appendix Table A1 for a
precise description of all these variables. Estimation methods: Local Linear Regression (LLR) with bandwidth h = 500 or
h = 750; spline polynomial approximation with 3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial. Robust standard errors clustered at the
municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***.
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Table A.5: The political economy of deficit bias, part I – Falsification test
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
With two parties or less:
Deficit 4.342 -11.267 -2.061 2.368
(8.885) (10.361) (11.445) (12.799)
Obs. 680 988 2,217 2,217
With more than two parties:
Deficit -2.905 -0.567 -1.459 -9.829
(11.359) (10.595) (13.363) (15.094)
Obs. 580 864 1,963 1,963
Difference between
the two subsamples -7.247 10.700 0.602 -12.197
Wald test p-value
without covariates 0.185 0.393 0.168 0.144
With binding term limit:
Deficit -4.222 0.764 2.291 -24.228
(14.889) (13.381) (17.202) (22.308)
Obs. 388 550 1,213 1,213
Without binding term limit:
Deficit -2.862 -9.567 -4.463 4.983
(11.869) (10.969) (13.794) (16.837)
Obs. 872 1,302 2,967 2,967
Difference between
the two subsamples 1.360 -10.331 -6.754 29.211
Wald test p-value
without covariates 0.945 0.559 0.762 0.303
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1997 and 2001. Diff-in-disc esti-
mates of the impact of the false relaxation of fiscal discipline below 5,000 after 1999 in different subsamples (that is,
above vs. below median number of parties; binding vs. non-binding term limit). Estimation methods: Local Linear
Regression (LLR) with bandwidth h = 500 or h = 750, as in equation (1.5); spline polynomial approximation with
3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial, as in equation (1.6). The Wald test p-value without covariates evaluates whether the
estimates are statistically different in the two subsamples. The Wald test p-value with covariates is not available because
of data limitations before 1999. All variables are per capita and in 2009 Euros. Robust standard errors clustered at the
municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the
1% level by ***.
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Table A.6: The political economy of deficit bias, part II – Falsification test
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
Young cohorts above median:
Deficit 4.124 -6.322 0.741 2.273
(9.125) (9.933) (11.431) (12.944)
Obs. 805 1,160 2,599 2,599
Young cohorts below median:
Deficit 2.581 -0.816 3.824 -1.688
(15.266) (12.143) (16.911) (21.845)
Obs. 455 692 1,581 1,581
Difference between
the two subsamples -1.543 5.506 3.083 -3.961
Wald test p-value
without covariates 0.933 0.733 0.885 0.882
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1997 and 2001. Diff-in-disc estimates
of the impact of the false relaxation of fiscal discipline below 5,000 after 1999 in different subsamples (that is, above
vs. below median percentage of young cohorts). Estimation methods: Local Linear Regression (LLR) with bandwidth
h = 500 or h = 750, as in equation (1.5); spline polynomial approximation with 3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial, as
in equation (1.6). The Wald test p-value without covariates evaluates whether the estimates are statistically different in
the two subsamples. The Wald test p-value with covariates is not available because of data limitations before 1999. All
variables are per capita and in 2009 Euros. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.7: Fiscal restraints and budget management – Falsification test
LLR LLR Spline Spline
h = 500 h = 750 poly 3rd poly 4th
Speed of public good provision above median:
Deficit 2.989 -2.653 6.135 0.430
(9.812) (8.166) (10.751) (13.740)
Obs. 652 977 2,283 2,283
Speed of public good provision below median:
Deficit 0.842 -10.780 -9.531 -3.501
(11.906) (14.003) (15.465) (15.622)
Obs. 608 875 1,897 1,897
Difference between
the two subsamples -2.147 -8.127 -15.666 -3.931
Wald test p-value
without covariates 0.883 0.607 0.381 0.840
Notes. Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; between 1997 and 2001. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact
of the false relaxation of fiscal discipline below 5,000 after 1999 in different subsamples (that is, above vs. below median
speed of public good provision). Estimation methods: Local Linear Regression (LLR) with bandwidth h = 500 or
h = 750, as in equation (1.5); spline polynomial approximation with 3rd-order or 4th-order polynomial, as in equation
(1.6). The Wald test p-value without covariates evaluates whether the estimates are statistically different in the two
subsamples. The Wald test p-value with covariates is not available because of data limitations before 1999. All variables
are per capita and in 2009 Euros. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Notes. Test of the continuity at 5,000 of: (i) the difference between the density in the 2001 Census and in the 1991 Census
(top graph); (ii) the density in the 2001 Census (bottom left graph); and (iii) the density in the 1991 Census (bottom
right graph). The central line is a spline 3rd-order polynomial fit in population size; the lateral lines represent the 95%
confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50 inhabitants.
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−100 −50 0 50 100
Normalized diff−in−disc coefficients
Deficit
Notes. Placebo tests based on permutation methods for deficit. The figure reports the empirical c.d.f. of the normalized
point estimates from a set of diff-in-disc estimations at 500 false thresholds below and 500 false thresholds above the true
threshold at 5,000 (namely, any point from 4,900 to 4,400 and any point from 5,100 to 5,600). Estimation method: spline
polynomial approximation with 3rd-order polynomial. The vertical lines indicate our benchmark estimate for deficit
from Table 1.5 (i.e., true coefficient normalized to 100) and its negative value.
137











−100 −50 0 50 100
Normalized diff−in−disc coefficients
Fiscal gap
Notes. Placebo tests based on permutation methods for fiscal gap. The figure reports the empirical c.d.f. of the nor-
malized point estimates from a set of diff-in-disc estimations at 500 false thresholds below and 500 false thresholds
above the true threshold at 5,000 (namely, any point from 4,900 to 4,400 and any point from 5,100 to 5,600). Estima-
tion method: spline polynomial approximation with 3rd-order polynomial. The vertical lines indicate the normalized
benchmark estimate for fiscal gap from Table 1.5 (i.e., true coefficient normalized to 100) and its negative value.
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B.1 Appendix Figures
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6 − Total Expenditures
Notes: Graphs 1 to 5 report the coefficients on the ghost building intensity for each election before and after the
beginning of the Ghost Buildings program. The modal number of years between elections is five years between
1993 and 2001, and four afterwards. On the x-axis, elections are ranked based on their occurrence relative to the
program. Graph 6 reports the coefficients on the ghost building intensity for each calendar year before and after
the beginning of the Ghost Buildings program. The dependent variable is in natural logarithm. On the x-axis,
years are ranked based on their occurrence relative to the program. We drop the year of program inception due
to its ambiguous treatment status. In all the graphs, the regression includes town and year fixed effects. We
report the point estimate and the 95% confidence interval. The last election/year before the program (“-1") is the
omitted category. The coefficient on ghost building intensity for this group is normalized to zero. Confidence
interval width for this election is obtained as the mean of the confidence interval width in election/year -2 and
election/year +1.
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Start Year of Election Sample
Notes: The figure presents robustness of the results on incumbent reelection to changes in sample years. The
y-axis shows the coefficient (and 95% confidence intervals) on the interaction between ghost building intensity
and the post-program indicator as estimated in our baseline specification (Table 2.4). The x-axis is the start year
of the alternative election samples we use (the final year is 2011 for all the samples). The first sample, 1993-2011,









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Extension to Model
Differentiating the social welfare function with respect to the length of leave, µ, we employ the envelope theorem
and ignore both ∂Lm∂µ and
∂Lw










Using men’s and women’s wage from expression 3.8, we obtain the following first order condition:
v0(µ) = [
l+1
l Lw   2 ll bmLm
2Lw   bmLm ]c
0(µ) (A1)
Note that when l = 1 the first order conditions in expressions A1 and 3.9 are identical. This means that the
weight on men’s utility does not affect the analysis in the main text when l = 1, but as will be now shown, it
cannot be too large when l > 1.
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∂µ   2 ll bm ∂Lm∂µ )(2Lw   bmLm)
(2Lw   bmLm)2 ]c
0(µ)
+[
(2 ∂Lw∂µ   bm ∂Lm∂µ )( l+1l Lw   2 ll bmLm)
(2Lw   bmLm)2 ]c
0(µ) < 0 (A2)
Since c00 (µ) > 0 > v00 (µ), and since ∂Lw∂l > 0 and
∂Lm
∂l < 0, the first three terms in expression A2 are negative,
and only the fourth term is positive.
Assuming the second order condition holds, we can employ the implicit function theorem on the first order
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Since ∂Lw∂l > 0 and
∂Lm
∂l < 0, the second term in expression A3 is positive. The first term in in expression A3
is positive as well, as long as bm is not too large. Thus, as in the main text, we get that
∂µ˜
∂l > 0, that is the less
society is willing to tolerate gender based discrimination the longer the maternity leave it will provide.
C.2 Data Appendix
• United Nations Statistical Division, Statistics and Indicators on Women and Men
– Source: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/
indwm/statistics.htm
– Variables: Length of Maternity Leave (June 2010), Total Population (June 2010), Total Fertility Rate
(June 2010), Percentage of Parliamentary Seats in Single or Lower Chamber Occupied by Women
(2005).
• Penn World Table
– Source: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
– Variables: Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita, current price (2006), Government Share of Real
Gross Domestic Product per Capita, current price (2006).
• Ethnologue
– Source: http://www.ethnologue.com/web.asp
– Varible: Most widely spoken language in each country.
• CIA World Factbook
– Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/fields/2098.html
– Variable: Most widely spoken language in each country.
• World Value Survey
– Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
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Albanian 2 Italian 2
Arabic 4 Korean 2
Bulgarian 1 Latvian 2
Catalan 2 Lithuanian 2
Croatian 2 Luxembourgish 1
Czech 2 Macedonian 1
Danish 1 Mandarin 0
Dutch 1 Persian 0
English 1 Portuguese 2
Finnish 0 Romanian 2
French 2 Russian 1
German 1 Serbian 2
Greek 2 Spanish 4
Hebrew 4 Swedish 1
Hindi 0 Turkish 0
Hungarian 0 Ukrainian 1
Icelandic 2
– Variables: Men should have more right to a job than women, Scale of income, Marital status, Age,
Highest educational level attained.
• International Labor Organization, Maternity Protection Database
– Source: http://www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/
maternityprotection
– Variable: Length of Paternity Leave
C.3 Language Coding
One of the stable grammatical features of a language is its use of personal pronouns. Personal pronouns are
gender differentiated in some cases, but in other cases they are not. We code, using grammar books, the number
of cases of gender differentiated personal pronouns in 33 languages. Table C.1 presents our data.
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